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I. Introduction
U.S.-Cuban relations are currently at a crossroads. The United
States wishes for Cuba to adopt a democratic form of government and
a market-based economic system, consistent with the U.S. international
goals of freedom and private enterprise.' Cuba wishes for the United
States to lift its economic embargo so that Cuba may advance from its
current economic hardships and become fully integrated into the in-
ternational community.2 With the demise of the Soviet Union and its
I There are several U.S. government-funded programs aimed at democratic develop-
ment. The Agency for International Development (AID), the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the
U.S. Informational Agency (USIA) all have conducted activities that support democratic
processes. Promoting Democracy - Foreign Affairs and Defense Agencies Funds and Activities - 1991 to
1993, GAO REPORT, Jan. 4, 1994. The following legislation authorizes U.S. assistance for
democratic development: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1978; National Endowment for Democracy Act
(1983); The Asia Foundation Act (1983); International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1985; Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989; Urgent Assist-
ance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990; the National and Community Service Act of
1990; and FREEDOM Support Act (1992). Id. Other related legislation includes the United
States Information and Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended. Id.
Assistance for democratic development increased from $682,000,000 in 1991 to $736,000,000
in 1992, to $900,000,000 in 1993. Id. These figures do not include U.S. contributions to the
United Nations peacekeeping activities. Id.
2 Cuban President Fidel Castro has conducted an aggressive international campaign to
lift the embargo without making any economic or political concessions in return. Castro
cogently summarized his view on the embargo in a Venezuelan newspaper, stating that the
Cuban position "is a worthy one: Lift the embargo without any conditions." John P. Sweeney,
Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should be Maintained, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Nov. 10, 1994 (cit-
ing Manuel Abrizo, Castro to the U.S.: If They Want My Head, I'll Give It To Them, EL NACIONAI.,
Sept. 25, 1994). Of the dangers facing Cuba, Castro stressed that the U.S. embargo was
"Numero uno, numero uno." America and Cuba; Dealing with Numero Uno, ECONOMIST,July 16,
1994, at 24. Cuba has also been successful in obtaining the U.N. General Assembly's condem-
nation of the embargo. See infra part V.C.3.
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concomitant subsidies to Cuba, the current focus of the U.S.-Cuban
relationship is not whether to lift the embargo, but how to lift it. The
issue of how to lift the embargo is therefore timely because both coun-
tries seek to end the 34-year-old stalemate.
Regardless of the reasons that the U.S. government may give to
justify its actions, the embargo against Cuba is economic.3 Over the
years, the executive branch has given a myriad of political reasons to
justify the embargo.4 There has nonetheless been one unifying funda-
mental issue: Cuba's confiscation of U.S.-owned private property in
violation of international law. 5 This Article diverges from other analy-
ses of the embargo because of its focus on the economic and legal
aspects of the embargo, not the commonly heard political rhetoric.
Although human rights issues, lingering anti-Communist sentiments,
and demands of the Cuban-American electorate are important vari-
ables in the embargo equation, the only economic issue is the violation
of private property rights. As will be shown, there are three common
approaches to the embargo: the liberal humanitarian view,6 the con-
servative free trade view, 7 and the conservative isolationist view. 8 None
of these approaches focuses on the economic aspects of the embargo;
and therefore, they provide inadequate policy responses. Given the
economic nature of the embargo, the United States should not lift the
embargo against Cuba until Cuba agrees to discharge the obligations
arising out of its confiscation of U.S.-owned property.
3 The U.S. Department of Treasury supervises the embargo through the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994). The provisions of these Regulations are exclu-
sively and explicitly economic. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. Moreover,
Cuba is not to receive any assistance or portion of the sugar quota until Cuba has taken steps
to return or compensate for confiscated property. See infra notes 103-108 and accompanying
text.
4 President Carter cited the "presence of Cuban troops in Angola, Cuba's 'aggravating
influence' on other countries of Latin America and human rights in Cuba as barriers to
normalization of relations from the U.S. viewpoint." Don Oberdorfer, US., Cuba Sign Pacts
on Fishing; US., Cuba Sign Fisheries Agreements; Agreements Viewed as a Step Toward Improved Rela-
tions, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1977, at Al. During the Reagan administration, State Department
spokesperson Charles Redman stated that the objective of the embargo was "to tighten en-
forcement of the embargo, denying to the Castro regime economic benefits from the United
States while Castro continues to ignore international obligations and to pursue policies inimi-
cal to U.S. interests." Gene Gibbons, Reagan Tightens U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba, REUTERS,
Aug. 23, 1986, available in LEXIS, News library, REUNA file. President Bush said that "Wash-
ington's trade embargo against Cuba will not be lifted until Castro agrees to elections moni-
tored by the United Nations." Jo Ann Zuniga, Shortages Spark Rumbling - but not Unrest - in
Cuba, Hous. CHRON.,JUIy 12, 1992, at Al. When asked what Cuba must do to bring an end to
the embargo, President Clinton said, "Mr. Castro knows the conditions for changing the
policy." James Harding, Passionate Talk, Little Action: James Harding Explains Domestic Forces
Shaping U.S. Policy on Cuba, FIN. TIME, Aug. 27, 1994, at 9. The Clinton administration later
stated that "before the embargo is lifted, Cuba's communist rulers must take steps toward
democracy." Castro Plays it Cook" Problems Remain, Despite U.S.-Cuba Refugee Dea Hous. Posr,
Sept. 12, 1994, at A14.
5 See infra notes 111-186 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
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The amount of property that Cuba has confiscated is daunting.
The value of the claims registered with the U.S. Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission 9 (hereinafter "FCSC") is $1,851,057,358.10 The
present compensable value of this amount is $13,051,845,500.11 There
were a total of 5,911 property claims awarded, 12 ranging from the
seizure of the property of multimillion-dollar U.S. multinationals to
the loss of private residences by middle-class Cubans. 13 Because the
majority of confiscated property was owned by U.S. corporations, 14 this
analysis will focus on U.S. corporate property claims.
Part II of this Article provides -the historical background of the
U.S. embargo against Cuba as well as its statutory authority. Part III
discusses the international law of expropriation, which provides that a
country may expropriate property only if the taking is for a public pur-
pose, is non-discriminatory, and is met with just compensation. Part IV
provides that full compensation is the appropriate standard to com-
pensate owners, either as restitution or the fair market value at time of
taking plus interest. Furthermore, Part V asserts that Cuba's confisca-
tion of U.S.-owned property is in violation of international law and that
Cuba has an obligation to fully compensate the U.S. owners. This sec-
tion also addresses the consequent U.S. embargo, justifying its exist-
ence under international law. Finally, Part VI suggests the remedy of
restitution and a bilateral investment treaty so that both countries can
come to an agreement and bring an end to two generations of
hostilities.
9 The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission is a branch of the Department ofJustice
that follows a statutory procedure to determine the amount and validity of claims against a
foreign government. The FCSC was an integral part of the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (1950), (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1621-1645 et seq. (1992)),
which was enacted out of a "growing concern of the United States regarding violations by
Communist governments of the rights of American citizens who owned property in foreign
countries." Edward D. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and the Cuban Claims Pro-
gram, I INT'L L. 81, 83 (1966). The Title V amendment to the International Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1949 [hereinafter "Cuban Claims Act"] authorizes the FCSC to determine the
amount and validity of claims against the Cuban government. Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat.
1110 (1964) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k (1964)). Section 1643b provides that the
FCSC "shall receive and determine in accordance with applicable substantive law, including
international law, the amount and validity of claims" by U.S. nationals against Cuba arising
from January 1, 1959 for "losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, interven-
tion or other taking of, or special measures directed against, property including any rights or
interests therein owned wholly or partially, directly or indirectly at the time by nationals of
the United States." Id.
10 1987 FOR. CLAIMS SEIrLEMENT COMM. ANN. REP. 55.
1I This figure equals the value of the property at the time of taking times six percent
interest compounded annually for 34 years. See infra part III.A. for a discussion of this
standard.
12 1972 FOR. CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM. ANN. REP. 412, 412 [hereinafter 1972 FCSC].
The FCSC has not updated or revised this figure.
13 David L. Marcus, Nurturing a Dream; Cuban Exiles in U.S. Work Toward Democracy but.
Follow Different Paths, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21, 1993, at 1A.
14 Approximately 88% of property taken was owned by U.S. corporations. See 1972
FCSC, supra note 12, at 412.
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II. The Embargo
A. Historical Background
On January 1, 1959, Comandante Fidel Castro announced over
Cuban radio, "Revoluci6n, si; golpe militar, no!" ("Revolution, yes; mili-
tary coup, no!"). 15 Former President Fulgencio Batista announced his
intention to leave the country that morning16 and fled for Santo Dom-
ingo.17 Fidel Castro stepped in as the new leader of Cuba who could
mold the island in any way he wished.18 On January 6, Castro an-
nounced that his regime had complete control of Cuba and that Cuba
would fulfill all of its existing international commitments. 19
The Castro regime "quickly instituted substantial changes in
Cuba."20 The new government proceeded to diminish the role of for-
eign enterprise in Cuba and concentrate production in the hands of
the Cuban government.2' Because land reform was an important ob-
jective of the revolution, Cuba employed a massive and complete con-
fiscation of foreign-owned property to effect a shift in ownership.22
The Agrarian Reform Law ofJune 1959 (hereinafter "Agrarian Re-
form Law") was the first major reform legislation in Cuba that affected
foreign-owned property.2 3 The Agrarian Reform Law required the ex-
propriation of foreign-owned land "in excess of certain limits." 24 The
expropriated land was then either distributed to Cuban citizens or
transformed into agricultural cooperatives managed by the newly cre-
ated Cuban National Institute of Agrarian Reform (hereinafter
15 HERBERT L. MATrEws, REVOLUTION IN CUBA 121 (1975).
16 ROBERT E. QUiRK, FIDEL CASTRO 207 (1993).
17 Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State (Jan. 1, 1958), in
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9855, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S., 1958-1960:
CUBA, VOL. VI, at 333 (John P. Glennon, ed. 1991) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
U.S.: CUBA].
18 MATTEWS, supra note 15, at 124-25.
19 Memorandum From Secretary of the State to the President (Jan. 7, 1959), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 347 [hereinafter Memorandum].
20 Kyle A. Silverman, Act of State Doctrine: Determining its Viability in a Suit Involving an
Exprof .ation by Cuba of Foreign-Owned Assets, 14 L. AMER. 337, 338 (1982).XPnId.
22 Castro emphasized land reform in his famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech:
The Second Revolutionary Law would have granted property to all planters,
subplanters, lessees, partners, and squatters who hold parcels of five or less
caballerias of land, and the state would indemnify the former owners on the
basis of the rental they would have received on these parcels over a period of
ten years.
La Historia Me Absolverd, El Pensamiento de Fidel Castro 21 (1963), reprinted in MICHAEL W.
GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 76
(1976) [hereinafter GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS].
23 Ley de Reforma Agraria 1959, 7 Leyes del Gobierno Provisional de la Revoluci6n 135
(1959); Decreto No. 1426, 17 Mayo 1959, Gaceta Oficial (Edici6n Extraordinaria) June 4,
1959, reprinted in GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATION supra note 22, at 72-73 [hereinafter
the Agrarian Reform Law]. See also Michael Gutelman, The Socialization of the Means of Produc-
tion in Cuba, in CUBA IN REVOLUTION 238-60 (Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Vald(s eds.,
1972).
24 Editorial Note, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 509.
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"INRA").25 The Agrarian Reform Law also allowed sugar companies to
continue operating only if Cuban citizens owned the companies'
stock. 26
The Agrarian Reform Law further provided that the government
would compensate the owners with twenty-year bonds, bearing an an-
nual interest rate of 4.5%.27 The compensation plan, however, was il-
lusory and from the outset could not have adequately compensated the
foreign owners. To generate the revenues necessary to pay for the
property, Castro made a public proposal that the United States in-
crease its purchase of Cuban sugar from approximately 3,000,000 tons
of sugar per year28 to 8,000,000 tons. 29 However, an immediate in-
crease of nearly 200% was not practical.3 0 At that time, Cuba's total
sugar output was approximately 5,900,000 tons3 1 and Cuba had never
produced more than 7,200,000 tons.3 2 During this period of agrarian
reform, sugar production was expected to decline in Cuba.3 3 Moreover,
in 1959 Cuba was absorbing seventy-one percent of the U.S. foreign
sugar quota,34 and thirty-three percent of the entire U.S. sugar quota, 35
a figure set pursuant to the Sugar Act of 1948.36 The United States
indicated that a further increase of the Cuban quota would be unfair
25 IL
26 Id.
27 Agrarian Reform Law, supra note 23, art. 31.
28 The 1959 quota allotment for Cuba was approximately 3,215,000 tons. 106 CONG.
REc. 15,236 (1960) (hereinafter CONG. RIc.]. For the authority of the sugar quota, see Act of
Aug. 8, 1947, infra note 36.
29 40 DEP'T ST. BULL. 959, 959 (1959) [hereinafter BULLETIN 1].
30 HUGH THOMAS, CUBA; THE PURUIT OF FREEDOM 1224 (1971).
31 Bryan T. Johnson, Preparing for a Free Market Cuba, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Apr. 8,
1992, at 1.
32 Cuba produced this amount in 1952. Ron Ridenour, Short Change on a Two-Way Ticket;
South Survey: Cuba; includes related articles on hardship in Cuba, S. MAG.,June, 1990, at 45. More-
over, Cuba's sugar production has had an annual growth rate of less than one percent.
Cuba's sugar output in 1987 was about 7,200,000 tons. SeeJohnson, supra note 31, at 1.
33 Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State (June 12, 1959), in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 529 [hereinafter Telegram 1]. Cu-
ban officials also announced on many occasions their desire to diversify agricultural produc-
tion to eliminate "the evils of monopolization" and "the dependence on foreign markets."
Extension of Sugar Act of 1948 as Amended: Hearings Before the Comm. on Agriculture, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, 4 (1960) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Secretary of State Christian A. Her-
ter). Observers predicted that this sentiment, coupled with agrarian reform, would bring
about a yearly decline of at least 1,000,000 tons. Id.
34 In 1959, Cuba was allocated 3,060,000 tons; imports from other countries combined
amounted to 1,228,000 tons. See BULLETIN 1, supra note 29, at 959.
35 The sugar requirement for the United States in 1959 was estimated at 9,200,000 tons.
53% of this was allocated to domestic suppliers. Id.
36 Act of Aug. 8, 1947, ch. 519. 61 Stat. 922 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1100-1183 (1994)),
terminated by Act of Oct. 14, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-138, § 18(a), 85 Stat. 390 [hereinafter the
Sugar Act of 1948]. The Sugar Act of 1948 established import quotas for foreign producers
of sugar. The Secretary of Agriculture was required to project the annual U.S. requirement.
7 U.S.C. § 1111 (1958). U.S. growers were guaranteed an exclusive market for a specified
amount of short tons to be sold that year. 7 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(1) (1958). This quota is de-
ducted from the total projected U.S. need, and the remaining tonnage is apportioned among
foreign sugar producers on a pro rata basis. 7 U.S.C. § 1112(c)(1)-(3). Before 1960, the
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to domestic producers and other countries.3 7 Furthermore, the
United States did not have a demand for additional sugar.3 8
On June 11, 1959, the U.S. government dispatched an official
note to Cuba expressing its views with respect to the Agrarian Reform
Law.3 9 In this note, the U.S. government expressed sympathy for the
Cuban objectives of agrarian reform, stating that "soundly conceived
and executed programs" of agrarian reform can "contribute to a
higher standard of living, political stability, and social progress."40 The
United States also acknowledged that under international law, a state
has the right to take property within its jurisdiction for public pur-
poses, but "this right is coupled with the corresponding obligation [of]
prompt, adequate and effective compensation."4 1 Castro responded
by telling U.S. Ambassador Bonsal that his revolutionary government
"was honest and would fulfill promises to pay." 42
Soon after the United States dispatched the note, Cuba began to
confiscate U.S.-owned property.43 In response to the Cuban actions
toward the United States, the U.S. government contemplated adjusting
sugar quotas.44 Assistant Secretary of State Mann stated that cutting
the quota may be necessary because it was "not realistic or desirable to
subsidize a Government engaging in extraordinary acts harmful to
American interests."45 At that time, the United States was paying Cuba
nearly twice the price of the world level,46 and it seemed more sensible
to allocate this quota to countries friendly to and respectful of U.S.
property interests. 4 7 Despite these misgivings, Congress established
the annual quota for 1960 at 3,119,655 tons.48
In 1959 alone, Cuba "seized property belonging to more than
5,000 individuals and 500 companies."4 9 Tensions heightened due to
Castro's persistent threats against the United States.50 U.S. property
largest U.S. import of Cuban sugar was 4,527,000 tons in 1922. See CONG. REc., supra note 28,
at 15, 236.
37 See BULLETIN 1, supra note 29, at 959.
38 Id.
39 Id at 958.
40 Id.
41 Id. See infra part III for a discussion of this standard.
42 See Telegram 1, supra note 33, at 529.
43 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 78.
44 Id. at 81.
45 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington (Sept. 24, 1959),
in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, SUpra note 17, at 605, 608.
46 In October of 1959, the United States was paying 5.66 cents per pound of sugar. The
world price at this time was 3.14 cents. CONG. Rc., supra note 28, at 15240.
47 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 333.
48 Tad Szulc, Cuba Exploiting Discord with US., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1959, at Al.
49 RUBY HART PHILLIPS, THE CUBAN DILEMMA 142 (1962). Within the first ten months
after its enactment, Cuba confiscated approximately 850,000 hectares (2,100,350 acres). See
Gutelman, supra note 23, at 242.
50 See Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
(Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon) (Dec. 28, 1959)) in FOREIGN RELATIONS
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owners were regularly harassed by Cuban officials. 51 The Cuban gov-
ernment refused to respond in a positive way to repeated U.S. efforts
to "seek a friendly solution to the problem of expropriation. ' 52
Furthermore, Cuba did not implement the Agrarian Reform Law
according to its expressed requirements. The INRA confiscated prop-
erty in a random and offensive manner. 53 President Eisenhower com-
mented that INRA was not observing the Law and that U.S. citizens'
property was "seized without even a pretense of observing the Castro
regime's own laws; so far as I know the promised bonds have not even
been printed. '54 Castro thus was not concerned with the legal proce-
dures of the Agrarian Reform Law, but instead, was motivated by the
need to remove ownership from foreign control.55
U.S.-Cuban tensions reached a fever pitch in 1960. Cuba esca-
lated the rate of confiscation of foreign-owned property in January of
that year.56 An increasingly restless Congress responded by passing a
new sugar bill on July 6, 1960, amending the Sugar Act of 1948.5 7 The
act gave the President discretionary authority to set the Cuban sugar
quota at any figure until March 31, 1961.58 To account for the reduc-
tion of Cuban sugar, the United States granted higher quotas to other
foreign countries.59 Castro responded to this U.S. threat by imple-
menting the Nationalization Law"° directed solely at the confiscation of
OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 716 (discussing the continued Cuban harassment of U.S.
property owners in Cuba).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The confiscations were not in any way consistent with the provisions of the Agrarian
Reform Law. See GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 76. The INRA
"made up such rules as each particular situation seemed to dictate." Id. INRA agents gener-
ally "ignored formalities" despite the fact that property owners attempted to comply with
requirements of the Agrarian Reform Law by assisting in the identity documentation of their
property. Id.
54 Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan (July 11, 1960), in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 1001.
55 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 84. See also RHODA P.
RABIUN, CUBAN POLITICS; THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIMENT 29-30 (1991). ("It was plain from
the way that the expropriation was carried out - with no accounting made of property
seized, nor receipts issued - that the Cuban government was uninterested in paying any
form of compensation"); MAURICE HALPERIN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO 58
(1972) (Agrarian Reform "became a process of helter-skelter expropriation of properties
with no regard to legal procedures").
56 See Gutelman, supra note 23, at 242. "In January of 1960, the rhythm of confiscations
was suddenly accelerated. In one week, more than 600,000 hectares [1,482,600 acres] were
confiscated. Id. By May 1961, Cuba confiscated 4,438,879 hectares [10,968,470 acres]." Id. at
246.
57 Act of Aug. 8, 1947, as amended, Pub. L. No. 86-592, 74 Stat. 330 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 1158 (1960)).
58 Id. § (b)(1).
59 Id. § (b)(2).
60 Ley 851,July 6, 1960, Gaceta Oficial,July 7, 1960, reprinted in 55 A.J.I.L. 822-24 (1961)
[hereinafter Nationalization Law]. Resolution No. 1, issued pursuant to Law 851, authorized
the nationalization of Cuban concerns in which U.S. citizens owned majority interests. See,
e.g., Claim of American Cast Iron Pipe Company, Claim No. CU-0249, Decision No. CU-13, 25
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U.S. property. The law authorized Cuban officials to nationalize prop-
erty whenever they deemed "it convenient in defense of the national
interest."61 The Nationalization Law also provided for payment by
thirty-year bonds62 with two percent interest.63 Castro hoped to gener-
ate the revenue from a dollar surplus fund created by profits from sales
of over 3,000,000 tons of sugar purchased annually by the United
States.64
The compensation fund as established by the Nationalization Law
was patently inadequate. Even without a reduction of the sugar quota,
it was unlikely that Cuba could ever have created such a fund.65 How-
ever, Cuba's failure to comply with the compensation provisions of the
Nationaliza ion law was partly a result of actions taken by the U.S. gov-
ernment as revenues from foreign sales were Cuba's primary method
of compensation. 66
Although the United States may have known that it was hamper-
ing Cuba's ability to provide compensation, the United States was moti-
vated by more fundamental considerations. A primary U.S. concern
involved the possibility that Cuba would export its sugar to other coun-
tries.67 In early 1960, Castro entered into long-range commitments
with new purchasers in the Soviet Bloc. 68 On February 13, 1960, Cuba
signed its first five-year trade agreement for the sale of sugar to the
Soviet Union.69 Cuba signed trade agreements with East Germany for
50,000 tons and with Poland for 50,000 tons.70 Cuba also agreed to
FCSC SEMIANN. REiP. 49 (July-Dec. 1966) [hereinafter American Cast Iron Pipe Company]. Reso-
lution No. 2, issued pursuant to Law 851, listed certain U.S. banks as nationalized. See, e.g.,
Claim of First National Bank of Boston, Claim No. CU-2268, Decision No. CU-3071, see 1972
FCSC, supra note 12, at 281. Resolution 3 listed many other Cuban entities the U.S. citizens
owned or controlled. See, e.g., Claim of Simmons Co., Claim No. CU-2303, Decision No. CU-
3337, 1968 FCSC ANN. REP. 77.
61 Nationalization Law, supra note 60, art. 1.
62 Id. art. 5(E).
63 Id. art. 5(C).
64 Id. art. 5(B).
65 Few, if any Cuban assets were available for deposit into a claims fund. See Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Claims
of U.S. Nationals Against the Government of Cuba, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess. 164, 164 (1964). Leo-
nard Meeker, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, said that "it is clear that the
funds which would be available for distribution under a vesting of Cuban assets would be
trivial when compared to the losses which have been sustained." Id. He estimated the total
realizable assets to be $60,000,000. Id.
66 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 98 n.97.
67 Fidel Castro, The Case of Cuba is the Case of All Underdeveloped Countries, Address
Before the U.N. General Assembly, 31, 39 n.64 (Sept. 26, 1960), inTo SPEA THE TRUTH: WHY
WASHINGTON'S "COLD WAR" AGAINST CUBA DOESN'T END (Mary-Alice Waters ed. 1992) [here-
inafter Castro's Address].
68 Id. This agreement was for the sale of 1,000,000 tons of sugar per year for the five-
year term. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 33, at 4; 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 360, 360 (1960)
[hereinafter BULLETIN 2].
69 See Castro's Address, supra note 67, at 31.
70 See Hearings, supra note 33, at 4-5.
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supply the People's Republic of China with 80,000 tons.71 Because a
major purpose of the Sugar Act of 1948 was to protect the domestic
sugar supply, 72 the United States sought to diversify its sources of sup-
ply and reduce its dependence on Cuba.73 The predicted decline of
sugar production during agrarian reform coupled with these commit-
ments to Communist countries forced the United States to turn to
other countries to seek a stable source of sugar. 74
Another U.S. consideration was that cutting the sugar quota was
consistent with Cuban domestic interests. Cuban Minister of Com-
merce Radil Cepero Bonilla stated on Cuban television that "it would
be more advantageous to Cuba if the United States did not purchase a
single grain of sugar" from Cuba. 75 Ernesto "Che" Guevara, as Presi-
dent of the National Bank of Cuba, indicated that the sugar quota was
responsible for many of Cuba's economic and social difficulties, stating
that the sugar premium paid by the United States had the effect of
enslaving Cuba to a one crop economy.7 6 There were implications that
Castro wanted the United States to cut the sugar quota and to ulti-
mately end diplomatic relations so that he could more effectively al-
lege economic aggression. 77 For propaganda purposes in Cuba and
Latin America, Castro may have believed that U.S. defensive actions far
outweighed his provocations. 78
On July 7, 1960, President Eisenhower declared his plan to cut the
sugar quota.79 In his announcement, the President reiterated U.S.
concerns that the sugar supply to the United States from Cuba was
becoming unstable, especially in light of Cuba's commitment to stead-
ily increase exports of sugar to the Soviet bloc. 80 Moreover, Cuba had
recently expropriated several U.S. oil refineries, further prompting Ei-
senhower to cut the sugar quota.81
71 Id. at 5.
72 See Sugar Act of 1948, supra note 36.
73 See Hearings, supra note 33, at 5; BULLETIN 2, supra note 68, at 360.
74 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington (Sept. 24, 1959)
in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 7.
75 See BULLETIN 2, supra note 68, at 360 (emphasis added).
76 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 99 n.99.
77 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State (July 9, 1960) in
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: CUBA, supra note 17, at 995 [hereinafter Telegram 2]. The
sister-in-law of Foreign Minister Rafil Roa informed the U.S. embassy that she learned this
information from "sources close to Fidel Castro." Id.
78 Id.
79 Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960). With 739,752 tons left to
purchase from Cuba in 1960 under the quota arrangement, President Eisenhower reduced
the Cuban quota by 700,000 tons to 39,752 tons. While no decision regarding the 1961 quota
was made, it appeared predictable that the Cuban reaction to the 1960 reduction would be
sufficiently severe to nullify the quota for the following year. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONAL-
IZATIONS, supra note 22, at 99.
80 43 DEP'T ST, BULL. 140, 140 (1960).
81 Several commentators assert that Eisenhower reduced the amount of the sugar quota
to retaliate against Cuba's confiscation the U.S. oil refineries. See, e.g., ANDRts SUAREZ, CUBA:
CASTROISM AND COMMUNISM, 1959-1966 93 (1967) (emphasis added); RABEIN, supra note 55,
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The Cuban response was severe. The reduction of the sugar
quota intensified the hostility and motivated Castro to further expedite
the process of confiscation.82 As Cuba accelerated its confiscation of
U.S.-owned property, the United States protested, charging that the
Nationalization Law was discriminatory, arbitrary, confiscatory and
manifestly in violation of international law.83
On October 13, 1960, President Eisenhower announced a com-
plete ban on U.S. exports to Cuba except for nonsubsidized foodstuffs,
medicines, and medical supplies8 4 under the authority of the Export
Control Act.8 5 The President stated that the United States must carry
out its duty to "defend the legitimate economic interests of the people
of [the United States] against the discriminatory, aggressive, and inju-
rious economic policies of the Castro regime."86 The Cuban response
was swift: 8 7 by October 25 of that year, Castro had confiscated all re-
maining U.S.-owned property.88
President Kennedy took subsequent measures against Cuba as a
result of the property confiscations.8 9 On February 6, 1962, the Presi-
dent announced a trade embargo that prevented the importation of
any goods of Cuban origin, except as permitted by the Department of
Treasury.90 The President also confirmed President Eisenhower's ex-
port restrictions implemented under the Export Control Act.9 1
Since the the embargo went into effect, the property issue has
at 32; W. Raymond Duncan, Cuban-U.S. Relations and Political Contradictions in Cuba, in CON-
FLicT AND CHANGE IN CUBA 215, 221 (Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris eds., 1993).
82 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 99. On August 6, 1960,
Cuba formally confiscated utility companies and 36 sugar mills owned by U.S. firms; on Sep-
tember 17, Cuba confiscated Cuban branches of U.S. banks. Chronology, in CoNFucr AND
CHANGE IN CUBA xvii (Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Chronology].
83 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 171, 171 (1960).
84 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 715, 716 (1960).
85 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (repealed 1969).
86 Id.
87 On October 14, 1960, Castro confiscated 382 large enterprises; by October 25 Cuba
had confiscated an additional 166 enterprises. Chronology, supra note 82, at xvii.
88 THOMAS, supra note 30, at 1297. See also HALPERIN, supra note 55, at 82; Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1964) (discussing the completeness of
Cuban confiscations). In August of 1960, Nicolhs Guillkn, dean of Cuban Communist poets
published the following verses on the nationalization of U.S. enterprises:
Marti promised it to you
And Fidel accomplished it for you
It is done.
cited in SUAREZ, supra note 81, at 10 n.9.
89 Pamela S. Falk, Broadcasting from Enemy Territoly and the First Amendment: the Importation
of Informational Materials from Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 92 COLUM. L. Ray. 165,
170-71 (1992); Free Trade with Cuba Act: Hearing on H.R. 2229 Before the Subcommittee on Select
Revenue and the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
47, 47 (1994) (statement of U.S. Rep. Robert Menendez).
90 Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). See also discussion of CACIM infra
notes 98-102 and accompanying text. In 1992 Congress added new components to the em-
bargo with the Cuban Democracy Act. See infra part V.C.2.
91 Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
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gone unresolved. To date, Cuba has established no settlement fund
and has paid no approved claims.92
B. Statutory Authority
In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act 93
(hereinafter "TWEA") to permit the President to control wartime trade
with Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.94 In 1933, Congress
expanded the TWEA to cover peacetime national emergencies. 95 The
Supreme Court in Regan v. Wald&6 underscored the significance of the
Act, stating that the TWEA "gave the President broad authority to im-
pose comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries as a means of
dealing with both peacetime emergencies and times of war."97
Under the authority of the TWEA, the Treasury Department is-
sued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations98 (hereinafter "CACR") in
1963. The CACR prohibits all "transactions [that] involve property in
which [Cuba], or any national thereof, has ... any interest of any na-
ture whatsoever, direct or indirect"99 by "any person subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States."' 00 The CACR also provides the
statutory basis of the embargo, and the provisions are exclusively and
92 Testimony, June 14, 1995, Ignacio E. Sanchez, Attorney Kelley Drye and Warren, Senate For-
eign Relations Supporting Democracy in Cuba, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file
("To date, no U.S. properties have been returned nor have U.S. claimants been compen-
sated."); Re, supra note 9, at 81. See alSOJORGE I. DOMfNGUEZ, To MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR
REVOLUTION 191 (1989). For further information concerning U.S. claims for property seized
in 1959-1960, see Sidney Friedberg, The Measure of Damages in Claims again Cuba, INrrERAMEtI-
CAN ECON. An'. 23 (Summer 1969); Lynn Darrell Bender, U.S. Claims Against the Cuban Gov-
e nment, INTERAMERICAN ECON. Ant. 27 (Summer 1983).
93 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 1-44 (1988)).
94 The purposes of the Trading With the Enemy Act are set forth in COMMITTEE PRINT
OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMERCE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE Docu-
MENTS CONCERNING REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN TIME OF DECLARED NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 94 CONG., 2D SESS 47-48, 81, 158-60, 179 (Comm. Print 1976).
95 Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933). In 1977, Congress narrowed the TWEA
to apply only during wartime. Act of December 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625,
1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1988)). However, the amendment acted prospec-
tively, and provided that any emergency declared prior to the enactment of the amendment
could be extended year by year, thus permitting the grandparenting of the Cuban embargo.
Id. See also Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1981). Every year since the
passing of the amendment, Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have extended the
embargo in the national interest. Presidential Determinations No. 88-22, 53 Fed. Reg. 35,289
(1988); No. 89-25, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,089 (1989); No. 90-38, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,309 (1990); No. 91-
52,'56 Fed. Reg. 48,415 (1991); No. 92-45, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,125 (1992); No. 93-38, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,209 (1993); Memoranda of the President, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg.
53,153 (1979); 45Fed. Reg. 59,549 (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321 (1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797
(1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 36,563 (1985);
51 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 33,397 (1987).
96 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
97 Id. at 225-26.
98 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1985).
99 Id. § 515.201(b).
100 Id. § 515.201(b)(1).
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explicitly economic. 10 1 The CACR provides substantial civil and crimi-
nal penalties for violations. 10 2
Other U.S. statutory authority provides that property rights figure
explicitly into the embargo equation. For example, Section 2370 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961103 specifically refers to Cuba and
property rights:
[N]o assistance shall be furnished under this [Act] to any government
of Cuba, nor shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota authorizing
the importation of Cuban sugar into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under any law of the United States, until the Presi-
dent determines that such government has taken appropriate steps accord-
ing to international law standards to return to United States citizens ... or to
provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for property taken
... on or after January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba. 1° 4
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act further provides that the
President should continue the embargo against Cuba.1 0 5 The Act also
provides that "[n]one of the funds made available to carry out this Act,
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or the Arms Export Control Act
may be provided to a government or any agency or instrumentality
thereof,"' 0 6 if the government of such country has "nationalized or ex-
propriated the property of any U.S. [citizen]" 0 7 and has neither re-
turned the property nor provided adequate and effective
compensation' 0 8 within a certain period of time.109
The authority that justifies the embargo demonstrates that deriv-
ing compensation for confiscated property is the fundamental condi-
tion to be resolved before the United States will resume economic
relations with Cuba. The economic nature of the CACR, along with
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Relations Authori-
zation Act, underscore the condition that Cuba must resolve the prop-
erty issue prior to the liberalization of the U.S.-Cuban trade
relationship.' 1 0 The embargo against Cuba is thus fundamentally
101 The CACR includes prohibitions of "transactions involving [Cuba]," "transactions
with respect to securities," the "importation of and dealings in certain merchandise," and
"holding of certain types of blocked property in interest-bearing accounts." Id. § 515.201; Id.
§ 515.202; Id. § 515.204; Id. § 515.205.
102 Penalties include fines up to $50,000 or imprisonment for up to 10 years. ld.
§ 515.701.
103 Act of Sept. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified at 22 US.C. § 2370
(1988)).
104 Id. § 2370(a) (2) (emphasis added). The subsection begins with "[e]xcept as may be
deemed necessary by the President .. " Id. This language, however, does not detract from
the paramount position of the property rights.
105 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 10-236,
§ 526 108 Stat. 382, 475 (1994).
106 Id. § 527.
107 Id. § 527(a)(1)(A).
108 Id. § 527(a) (2) (A)-(B).
109 Id. § 527(c).
110 On September 9, 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995. H.R. REsP. No. 927, 104th Cong., 104th
1995]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 21
economic.
III. Requirements and Standards for Compensation
International agreements and international custom form the basis
of international law."'. International agreements are binding only
upon the consenting states.112 State agreements, however, may ulti-
mately become customary law. t" 3 International custom also arises
from a general practice among states"1 4 as well as from international
tribunal decisions, since a tribunal's rationale represents what the arbi-
trators defend in principle as the requirements of international law." 5
International law requires that a state pay full compensation for
takings of foreign-owned property. The Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States provides that taking that is
discriminatory, not for a public purpose, and not accompanied by
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation is unlawful. 116 Nu-
merous international sources have echoed this standard, including the
Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States
for Injuries to Aliens, 117 the OECD Draft Convention on the Protec-
tion of Foreign Property," 8 and various international treatises.' 19
"Confiscation" denotes a government taking of property without
compensation to the owner.120 Section 712 of the Restatement
Sess. The Act further establishes the property dimension to the embargo. Section 103 of the
Act prohibits any U.S. person from extending any loan or other financing to a foreign person
that traffics property confiscated by the Cuban government. Id. § 103. Section 108 further pro-
hibits the import of any sugars, syrups, and molasses that are the product of a country that
has imported these products from Cuba. Id. § 108. Damages owed by persons or govern-
ments dealing in confiscated property are set forth in Section 302. Id. § 302.
111 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945), art. 38 [here-
inafter Stat. of the I.CJ.]. Article 38 also states that international agreements and interna-
tional custom are the primary sources of international law. Id.
112 Stat. of the I.CJ., supra note 111. art. 38(l)(a). ee also Allen DeLoach Stewart, New
World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA.
L. REv. 1389, 1392 (1993).
113 Id. at 1392.
114 Stat. of the I.CJ., supra note 111, art. 38(1) (b). See also Louis HENRIN ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 55 (1993).
115 See Stat. of the I.C.J., supra note 111, art. 38(1)(d); Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 Am. J.
INT'L L. 474, 495 (1991).
116 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. For the text of Section 712, see infra note 269
and accompanying text.
117 [HARVARD] CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILTY OF STATES FOR INJU-
RIES TO ALIENS art. 10(2) (Draft No. 12, 1961).
118 O.E.C.D. Pub. No. 23081 (1967), notes and comments to art. 3, reprinted in 7 I.L.M.
117, 127 (1968).
119 See, e.g, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Legal Framework
for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Vol. 111 (1992); UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 31 (1988); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCI-
PLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 545 (1990).
120 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 119 n.24. "Nationaliza-
tion" is usually used to denote the taking of property, usually an industry or sector of the
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(Third) provides that "full" compensation requires the payment of, "in
the absence of exceptional circumstances ... an amount equivalent to
the value of the [foreign-owned] property taken ... paid at the time of
taking . . . and in a form economically usable by the foreign
[owner]."1 21 The Restatement (Third) merely codifies the customary
law standard, as embodied in the "Hull formula," stating that the inter-
national law of expropriation requires the payment of "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" compensation.1 22
A. International Customary Law
Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice states that "international custom [is] evidence of a general practice
accepted as law.. 1 23 The definition of custom comprises two distinct
elements: (1) "general practice" and (2) its acceptance into law.124
The following discussion shows that the customary law of compensa-
tion for confiscated property is a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law.
1. Origins of the International Law of Expropriation
The international law for confiscation of property has been clearly
established for over a century. The laissez-faire era from the mid-nine-
teenth century to World War I produced the legal rules governing
property takings.125 The underlying assumptions were derived from
European legal traditions, in which most states embraced the inviola-
bility of private wealth and the sanctity of contract.1 26 During this era,
the great majority of states had constitutions and treaties that permit-
ted direct expropriation only with compensation, but regarded any tak-
ing of private property as an aberration not impairing the inviolable
economy, without any implication, affirmative or negative, of compensation. BLAcK's LAW
DicnoN~av 1026 (6th ed. 1990). "Expropriation" is frequently used interchangeably with
nationalization, but has an implication of forthcoming compensation. Id. at 579.
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 712.
122 In a 1938 dispute over Mexico's expropriation of foreign-owned oil fields, U.S. Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull maintained that international law required Mexico to pay "prompt,
adequate and effective" compensation. In his correspondence with the government of Mex-
ico, Hull declared that the United States "merely adverts to a self-evident fact when it notes
that the applicable precedents and recognized authorities on international law support its
declaration that... no government is entitled to expropriate property... without provision
for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor. In addition, clauses appearing in the con-
stitutions of almost all nations today... embody the principle of just compensation." Repro-
duced in 3 G. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 658-59 (1942) (emphasis added).
123 Stat. of the I.CJ., supra note 111, art. 38(1)(b).
124 Id.
125 Richard B. Ullich, The Current Status of the Law of State Repo'siility for Injuries to
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nature of private property rights. 127
In 1928, the Permanent Court of International Justice codified
this customary law principle of full compensation for expropriation in
Factory at Chorzdw'28 (hereinafter "Chorzdw Factory"). Chordw Factory in-
volved the Polish expropriation of German-owned industrial property
in Upper Silesia.129 Germany claimed that Poland's expropriation vio-
lated the Convention Concerning Upper Silesia of May 15, 1922.130
The Court held for Germany, deeming that immunity from confisca-
tion is an accepted principle of international law and therefore the
expropriation was unlawful.1 31 The Permanent Court of International
Justice also stated the now famous passage that articulates the appro-
priate remedy for a taking:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act
- a principle which seems to be established by international practice
and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that repara-
tion must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability have ex-
isted if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is
not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear; [these principles] should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international
law. 13 2
Chorztw Factory is significant because, in addition to embodying
the customary law of international expropriations, it is the starting
point for many international tribunal decisions. 133 Moreover, Choszdw
Factory is important because the court based its opinion on prior deci-
sions made by international claims tribunals.'3 4 Numerous decisions
handed down between World Wars I and II have followed the Chorzdw
Factory precedent.s 5
127 Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MICH. L. REv.
445, 459 (1940).
128 Indemnity (Factory at Chorz6w), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter
Chorz6w Factory].
129 Id. at 5.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 29 ("the Court observes that it is a principle of international law, and even a
general conception of international law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obli-
gation to make reparation.").
132 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). This passage is dicta because the expropriation fell
within the context of a treaty. Nonetheless, the principle of full compensation for an illegal
taking, with the object of making the aggrieved owner whole, remains a fundamental
principle.
133 Norton, supra note 115, at 476.
134 See generally MANLE. 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 196 (1944) (discussing
international claims tribunals between the early nineteenth century and World War II, many
of which dealt with takings of property).
135 See, e.g., 0. Stutzer and Leslie Scott, 36 CORNELL L. REV. 42, 51-52 (1950) (citing Lena
Goldfields, Ltd. v. Russia (Judgement of Sept. 3, 1930); Smith v. Compafifa Urbanizadora del
Parque y Playa de Marciano, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 915, 917-18 (Hale, sole arb., 1929);
Shufeldt Claim (U.S. v. Guat.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1079, 1099 (Sisnett, sole arb., 1936)).
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2. Post-World War II Decisions
Between World War II and the early 1960s, arbitrators that ad-
dressed the international law of expropriation continued to uphold
the principle of full compensation. Four significant decisions arose
from efforts made by the states of the Middle East to terminate or rene-
gotiate long-term petroleum concessions. 136 Three common elements
of these decisions highlight the full compensation principle. 137 First,
none of the concession agreements between the United States and the
Middle Eastern countries had a clear choice-of-law clause.1 38 Each tri-
bunal thus applied general principles of international law. Second, to
ascertain the relevant international law, the arbitrators frequently cited
as precedents the decisions of earlier international arbitral tribunals
that had applied similar general principles of public international
law. 139 Third, in each instance the tribunal.held the concessionary
country to the terms of its concession, or to damages for its breach,
largely on the basis of this body of international precedent.' 40 These
decisions favor a precedent-based jurisprudence of expropriation and
support a continued requirement under international law for the pay-
ment of full compensation for expropriated property.1 4 '
.3. Resolutions Establishing A Requirement of Full Compensation
Upon gaining independence, many states questioned the custom-
ary international law of full compensation. 4 2 In response, the U.N.
General Assembly passed three resolutions regarding expropriation of
private property: (1) Resolution 1803, the Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources; 143 (2) Resolution 3201, the Decla-
ration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Or-
136 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (1958) [hereinafter
ARAMCO]; Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963)
[hereinafter Sapphire]; Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951).
[hereinafter Marine Oil]; Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 I.L.R. 534
(1951) [hereinafter Abu Dhabi]; Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., 20 I.L.R. 524
(1953) [hereinafter Qatar].
137 Norton, supra note 115, at 477.
138 See ARAMCO, supra note 136, at 167-69; Sapphire, supra note 136, at 170-75; Qatar,
supra note 136, at 545; Abu Dhabi, supra note 136, at 149.
139 See, e.g., ARAMCO, supra note 136, at 172; Sapphire, supra note 136, at 175.
140 SeeARAMCO, supra note 136, at 191-98, 205, 216-17; Sapphire, supra note 136, at 182-.
90; Abu Dhabi, supra note 136, at 150-57; Qatar, supra note 136, at 562-65.
14 Norton, supra note 115, at 477-78.
142 Developing countries asserted that only partial compensation is required for expro-
priations at an amount based on the state's capacity to pay without jeopardizing social or
general economic progress. See S.N. Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens a Part of Universal International Law ?, 55 A.J.I.L. 863 (1961); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, To-
WARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979).
143 U.N. Document A/RES/1803 (XVII), December 19, 1962, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223
(1963) [hereinafter Resolution 1803].
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der;144 and (3) Resolution 3281; the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States.145 These resolutions, however, are not binding inter-
national law and are merely evidence of international practice.
146
Resolution 1803 affirmed the customary law principle that a coun-
try has a duty to compensate a foreign national for expropriated prop-
erty.147 Article 4 of the resolution stipulated that compensation be
"appropriate."148 Although some countries asserted that "appropriate"
did not mean "full" and that compensation should be subject to inter-
pretation by the expropriating state, 149 Resolution 1803 more likely
reflected the "prompt, adequate and effective" standard as articulated
in the "Hull Formula."150 In fact, after the adoption of the draft reso-
lution with the term "appropriate," the United States noted the adop-
tion of the principle of international law that called for full
compensation in the event of expropriation.-"
A subsequent resolution allowed states to expropriate property as
a matter of national sovereignty.152 Article 4 of Resolution 3201 pro-
144 GA. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) [hereinafter Resolution 3201].
145 GA. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975) [hereinafter Resolution 3281].
146 All nations agree that U.N. resolutions are not legally binding. HENEiN, supra note
114, at 129. Instead, these resolutions may be considered as evidence of international cus-
tom or of a general principle of law. Id. Moreover, a resolution that has less than unanimous
support is more questionable than a resolution that has been adopted without a negative vote
or abstention. Id.
147 Resolution 1803 provides in part:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds of
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized
as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance
with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law.
Resolution 1803, supra note 143, art. 4 (emphasis added.)
148 Id.
149 See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 94 (6th ed.
1987); Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State, 176 RECUEIL DES couRs 259 (1982 II).
150 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of the U.N. 's Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, 49 A.BAJ. 463, 465-66 (1963). Department of State Advisor Schwebel, trac-
ing the legislative history of Resolution 1803, states that the General Assembly's treatment of
the resolution enhanced the U.S. view that appropriate compensation in accordance with in-
ternational law means prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Id. at 465.
151 Karol N. Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An Analytical Review of the
United Nations Declaration and its Genesis, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 398, 428 (1964). The author
argues that the language is form over substance: the United States allowed the terms to be
changed in a spirit of compromise, but the meaning did not change. Id. If "appropriate" did
not mean "full," it is unlikely that the United States would have voted for the resolution. See
id. The vote was a nearly unanimous 87 to 2 with 12 abstentions. Norton, supra note 115, at
476.
152 Resolution 3201 provides in pertinent part:
In order to safeguard [natural and economic] resources, each State is entitled
to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suita-
ble to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent
sovereignty of the State.
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vided for such expropriations, but did not include a provision for com-
pensation.' 53  The General Assembly remedied this deficiency with
Article 2 of Resolution 3281, which allowed states to expropriate prop-
erty only upon payment of "appropriate" compensation. 15 4 The Reso-
lution also referred the interpretation of "appropriate" to state law. 155
International law was not mentioned. 156
4. Subsequent Application of the Law of Expropriations
Despite many observers' contentions that "appropriate" may not
mean "full," arbitral tribunals have rejected partial compensation stan-
dards and reaffirmed that a country must fully compensate owners for
confiscated property.1 5 7 Tribunals have looked first at concession
agreements between the respective countries and the domestic law of
the confiscating country to determine whether a compensation rem-
edy was provided. 158 If a compensation remedy could not be found,
tribunals have relied on general principles of international law. Tribu-
nals have consistently held that full compensation is the appropriate
standard under international law. 159
British Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic160 involved
arbitration proceedings in connection with the Libyan expropriation
of British Petroleum's property.' 6 1 The arbitrator appointed by the
United Nations International Court of Justice found that Libya's con-
fiscation of BP's property "violate [d] public international law as it was
made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and dis-
criminatory in character."1 62 Following a comprehensive examination
of expropriation decisions, the arbitral tribunal found that restitutio in
Resolution 3201, supra note 144, art 4(3).
153 See id.
154 Resolution 3281 provides that each state has the right:
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such meas-
ures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent.
Resolution 3281, supra note 145, art. 2(2)(c) (emphasis added).
155 Id The vote was 118 to 6 with 10 abstentions. Norton, supra note 115, at 478. In
addition, the major capital-exporting states either opposed or abstained. Id.
156 Id. Article 2 states:
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to controversy, it
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that
other peaceful means by sought on the basis of sovereign equality of States and
in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Resolution 3281, supra note 145, art. 2(2)(c).
157 See infra notes 160-86 and accompanying text.
158 See infra notes 160-86 and accompanying text.
159 Norton, supra note 115, at 477-78.
160 53 I.L.R. 297 (1973) [hereinafter British Petroleum).
161 Id at 329.
162 Id.
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integrum163 was the proper remedy under international law. 164 Implicit
in the choice of this remedy is the principle that complete compensa-
tion is the appropriate remedy for an unlawful expropriation.,
Two subsequent Libyan arbitration decisions, TOPCO/CALA-
SIATIC165 and AMJNOIL,166 agreed that the "appropriate" compensa-
tion standard in Resolution 1803 is the standard under international
law. In TOPCO/ CALASIATIC, the arbitrator reasoned that restitutio in
integrum is the preferred remedy where there has been a wrongful ex-
propriation. 167 Five years later, the AMINOIL arbitration confirmed
that the "appropriate" compensation standard as set forth in Resolu-
tion 1803 requires full compensation. 168 Both of these standards are
equivalent to the U.S. view of Resolution 1803 that "adequate" com-
pensation means "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation. 169
The tribunal's decisions thus underscored the principle that "appro-
priate" compensation means "full compensation," and that this stan-
dard is applicable to expropriations under international law.170
In Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic,171 it was deter-
mined that "equitable" compensation is an acceptable formulation
under general principles of law, and thus under international law.
Nonetheless, the arbitrator asserted that "the classical formula of
'[prompt], adequate and effective compensation' remain [s] as a maxi-
mum and a practical guide for.., assessment.' 7 2
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which had jurisdiction over expro-
priation claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, confirmed the customary
law of full compensation for expropriation in the U.S.-Iran Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights. 173 In each of the
significant decisions handed down by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
the arbitrators examined the applicable legal standard of compensa-
tion for expropriations, and all of the majority opinions required the
163 "Restitutio in Integrum" is defined as restoration or restitution to the previous condi-
tion. BLACK'S LAw DiCTIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
164 British Petroleum, supra note 160, at 347.
165 Texas Overseas Petroleum Company & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) [hereinafter TOPCO/CALASIATIC].
166 Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982) [hereinafter
AMINOIL].
167 TOPCO/CALASIATIC, supra note 165, at 32-35.
168 AMINOIL, supra note 166, at 1033.
169 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, APPLICATION OF THE TREATY TO EXPROPRIATION IN IRAN, re-
printed in 129 CONG. REC. S16055 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1983).
170 See id. The tribunal acknowledged that Resolution 1803's "appropriate compensa-
tion" standard was valid international law because of its near unanimous acceptance. Subse-
quent resolutions (i.e., Resolutions 3201 and 3281) were not valid international law because
of the lack of consensus and challenge by developed nations. Id. See also TOPCO/CALA-
SIATIC, supra note 165, at 29.
171 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981).
172 Id at 86 (emphasis added).
173 See U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, infra note 197, art. III § 3.
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payment of full compensation. 174 For example, citing TOPCO/CALA-
SIATIC and AMINOIL, the arbitrators in Sola Tiles, Inc. v. Iran175 found
that recent arbitral and judicial tribunals generally equated the "appro-
priate" compensation standard with full compensation. 76
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
heard two disputes that further reinforced the full compensation stan-
dard. In Benvenuti et. Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo,177 the
court stated that the "principle of compensation in the event of nation-
alization is ... one of the generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law as well as of equity."178 The tribunal's analysis revealed that
the arbitrators intended this principle to mean "full compensation."' 7 9
In AGIP Co. v. Popular [sic] Republic of the Congo, °80 the tribunal
also based its determination of damages on the full compensation stan-
dard. 18 l AG1P involved the Congolese government's expropriation of
AGIP's assets.' 8 2 The tribunal reasoned that international law re-
quired that Congo compensate AGIP for damages suffered 83 includ-
ing both actual damages and lost profits.'8 4
5. Conclusion
Each recent arbitral tribunal decision has required that full com-
pensation be paid for expropriated property. While they do not es-
pouse the exact "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation
language of the Hull formula, they nonetheless require the payment of
full compensation and provide no support for a flexible standard. 8 5
174 American Int'l Group and Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96
(1983) (asserting the general principle of international law that "even in a case of lawful
nationalization the former owner of the nationalized property is normally entitled to com-
pensation for the value of the property taken"); Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton and
TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984) (holding that a claimant was "entitled
under international law and general principles of law to compensation for the full value of
the property of which it was deprived"); Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Interlocutory Award in
Case Concerning Sedco, Inc. and National Iranian Oil Co. and Iran, 25 I.L.M. 629, 634-35
(1986) (arguing that customary international law required the payment of full value); Amoco
Int'l Fin. Corp., 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987) (the international law of expropria-
tion authorizes restitutio in integrum in cases of unlawful expropriation); INA Corp. v. Iran, 8
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985) (restitutio in integrum and full compensation are the avail-
able remedies in cases involving unlawful expropriation).
175 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 223 (1987).
176 Id. at 484.
177 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982).
178 Id. at 758.
179 See id. at 758-61.
180 21 I.L.M. 726 (1979) [hereinafter AGIP].
181 Id. at 736.
182 Id. at 727. Congo expressly limited its right to expropriate the property in a provi-
sion contained in a investment contract. Id. at 735.
183 Id. at 736-37; Norton, supra note 115, at 488.
184 See AGIP, supra note 180, at 737.
185 M.H. Mendelson, Compensation for Expropriation: The Case Law, 79 AJ.I.L. 414, 415
(1985) (dismissing the semantic argument and asserting that the result would be the same if
they had applied the terminology of the Hull formula).
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Therefore, the full compensation holdings start from the premise that
the foreign investor must be "made whole."18 6
B. International Agreements
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice gives
first priority to "international conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." 187
The rights and duties of states are therefore determined in the first
instance by their agreement as expressed in treaties.1 88
Since 1982, there has been a proliferation of bilateral investment
treaties with explicit provisions that ensure compensation for expropri-
ated property. 189 A bilateral investment treaty (hereinafter "BIT") is
an agreement that protects investments of nationals and companies of
one contracting party in the territory of the other party.1 90 One of the
major purposes of the BIT program was to create a network of bilateral
investment treaties embracing the prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation standard of customary international law.1 91
From 1982 to 1986, the United States concluded ten BITs with
other states: Egypt, Panama, Morocco, Zaire, Cameroon, Bangladesh,
Senegal, Haiti, Turkey, and Grenada.192 A critical feature of these ne-
gotiations was the unwillingness of the United States to compromise
on the standard of compensation. 193
The collapse of the Soviet empire at the end of the 1980s brought
about a new wave of BITs in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.19 4 ByJan-
uary 1993, the United States had concluded agreements with Argen-
tina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Congo, the Czech and Slovak Republic,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Tuni-
sia. Throughout this second wave of BITs, the United States continued
to insist upon full compensation. 195
The language from the model BIT that was commonly .used in the
above-mentioned BITs provides:
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly
186 Norton, supra note 115, at 489.
187 Stat. of the I.C.J., supra note 111, art 38(1)(a).
188 1 LAuTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 86-87 (1970).
189 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J.
INTr'L L. 621, 627-28 (1993) [hereinafter Vandevelde, The Second Wave].
190 BITs were developed to protect U.S. investments and to reduce uncertainties associ-
ated with them, as well as to encourage a freer flow of capital investment. Kathleen Kunzer,
Developing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 L. POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 273, 273 (1983).
191 KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVEsiMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE
21 (1992) [hereinafter VANDEVELDE, POLICY AND PRACTICE].
192 See Vandvelde, The Second Wave, supra note 189, at 627-28.
193 VANDEVELDE, POLIcY AND PRACTICE, supra note 191, at 125. However, the BIT with
Haiti did not go into force because of political upheaval in Haiti in 1986. Robert I. Rotberg,
Haiti's Past Mortgages Its Future, 67 FOREIGN Arr., Fall 1988, at 94-95.
194 See Vandevelde, The Second Wave, supra note 189, at 633-34.
195 Id.
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or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or na-
tionalization ("expropriation") except for a public purpose; in a non-
discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation; and in accordance with due process of law ....
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the ex-
propriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action
was taken or became known; be paid without delay; be fully realizable;
and be freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on
the date of expropriation.1
9 6
Other treaties have embodied similar principles. For example,
the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity provides: 1
9 7
Property of [U.S. nationals] shall not be taken except for a public pur-
pose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just com-
pensation. Such compensation shall be in effectively realizable form
and shall represent the full equivalent of the property taken; and ade-
quate provision shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking
for the determination and payment thereof.
198
A recent example highlighting the full compensation principle is
the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA") 199
which states:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an in-
vestment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a mea-
sure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on
a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law,
and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs
2 through 6.2 o0
NAFTA provides that compensation shall be equivalent to the fair
market value immediately before the expropriation took place, with
valuation being a flexible standard to best compensate the owner.20 '
Compensation shall "include interest at a commercially reasonable
rate for that currency from the date of expropriation until the date of
actual payment."20 2 Moreover, compensation shall be paid "without
196 BIT Model Negotiating Text, September 1987 Draft, cited in VANDEVELDE, POLICY AND
PRAcrIcE, supra note 191, at A-4.
197 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
art IV, para. 2, U.S.-IRAN, 8 U.S.T. 899 (hereinafter U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity) (emphasis
added).
198 Id.
199 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289, 605 [hereinafter NAFI'A].
200 Id. art. 1110(1).
201 Article 1110 of NAFTA states:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expro-
priation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the in-
tended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall
include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangi-
ble property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
Id. art. 1110(2).
202 Id. art. 1110(4).
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delay and be fully realizable." 203
The negotiation of BITs in recent years has reaffirmed the tradi-
tional standard of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation by
explicitly including the full compensation standard.20 4 The insertion
of the Hull formula into these treaties also reinforces customary rules
of international law, as treaty practice and arbitral decisions are evi-
dence of such customs.20 5
IV. Full Compensation as the Standard under International Law
In Chorzdw Factory, the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated that the amount of compensation due for a wrongful taking is
"restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corre-
sponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear."20 6 This
principle is still valid under international law. Where restitution is not
possible, full compensation is the appropriate standard.20 7 Recent ar-
bitral tribunals that have considered the issue of compensation have
affirmed that customary international law requires a state that expro-
priates the property of a foreign national to pay the full value of that
property, measured,.where possible, by the market price at the time of
the taking plus interest from that date. 208
A. The Rate of Interest
1. Compound Interest as Part of Full Compensation
Full compensation requires that the property owners receive com-
pensation in an amount equivalent to the value of the property at the
time of taking plus compound interest. Although the Cuban Claims
Act 20 9 is silent on the issue of interest on claims that the FCSC certi-
203 Id. art. 1110(3).
204 Davis R. Robinson, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 A.J.I.L. 176, 177
(1984).
205 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. See also Oscar Schachter, Compensation for
Expropnation, 78 A.J.I.L. 121 (1986).
26 Chorz6w Factory, supra note 128, at 47.
207 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
208 Chorz6w Factory, supra note 128, at 46. If the payment of "fair compensation" can
render lawful under international law an expropriation or other taking of property, the Per-
manent Court of International Justice indicated that the measure of compensation was the
value of the property at the time of the taking plus-interest to the date of payment. Norton,
supra note 115, at 488.
The United States has embraced full compensation for Cuban property owners in the
Cuban Claims Act, supra note 9. Section 1643a provides the guide for determining the value
of full compensation:
In making the determination with respect to the validity and amount of claims
and value of properties, rights, or interest taken, the [Foreign Claims Settle-
ment] Commission shall take into account the basis of valuation most appropri-
ate to the property and equitable to the claimant, including but not limited to,
(i) fair market value, (ii) book value, (iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of
replacement.
22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (1976).
209 Cuban Claims Act, supra note 9.
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fled,210 the FCSC nonetheless held that international law requires that
Cuba pay interest as a "part of [a] claimant's loss" resulting from the
taking of U.S.-owned property.211 In reaching its decision, the FCSC
regarded "as a settled principle of international law that 'interest, ac-
cording to the usage of nations, is a necessary part of a just national
indemnification.' 2 12 The FCSC also relied upon the precept that the
award of interest is commonly determined to be only a part of making
full reparation.213 Moreover, the FCSC stated that the award of interest
not only is "in conformity with the principles in international law," but
also is "required by equity and justice."2 14
In connection with the applicable rate of interest, the FCSC deter-
mined that "In light of this international law precedent, custom and
tradition" that "the rate of 6% is an appropriate, equitable and just
measure of compensation.... 15 Finally, the FCSC ruled that interest
was to run "from the date the claim arose until the date of
payment."2 16
2. Property Owners are Entitled to Compound Interest
Only compound interest on the certified claims of U.S. citizens
against Cuba meets the principal objectives of the Cuban Claims Act:
the full and fair compensation of U.S. citizens for their losses in Cuba.
The FCSC's express purpose in awarding interest-is to ensure "full rep-
aration" for the "amount of loss" suffered in Cuba by U.S. citizens.
Such "full reparation" can only be achieved by compounding that
interest.217
There are also analogies in U.S. law that state compound interest
constitutes adequate interest. The U.S. Judicial Code states, "Interest
shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a
district court .... Interest shall be computed daily and shall be com-
pounded annually. "218
Authority from international sources also provides that compound
interest is properly awardable to compensate a party whose property
was expropriated by a foreign state. For example, in AMINOIL2 19 the
210 See American Cast Iron Pipe Co., supra note 60, at 50.
211 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 51 (quoting 6 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1029 (1906)).
213 See id
214 Id.
215 Id. at 52.
216 Id. Subsequently, the FCSC cited another case as authority for the inclusion of inter-
est. Claim of Lisle Corp., Claim No. CU-0644, Decision No. CU-0267 (1967).
217 Claggett argues that the award of simple interest is insufficient; if the purpose is to
make the owner whole "compounding is plainly required." Brice. B. Claggett, Present State of
the International Law of Compensation for Expropriated Property and Repudiated State Contracts, in
PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD - PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INT'L Bus. 18 (sponsored by the
Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1989).
218 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a)(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
219 AMINOIL, supra note 166, at 976.
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tribunal held that Kuwait's taking of the company's assets in 1977 left
Kuwait liable to Aminoil in the amount of $83,000,000.220 The tribu-
nal concluded its decision by awarding a total amount of $179,750,764
by capitalizing the $83,000,000 at a compound rate of 17.5% annually.22'
In Starret Housing Corp. v. Iran,222 Judge Holtzmann supported the
award of compound interest to the U.S. claimants to compensate them
for "the actual loss and damage they suffered." 22 3 There is also aca-
demic commentary affirming that compound interest is the appropri-
ate measure of interest.2
2 4
In light of this authority, Cuba must therefore pay compound in-
terest on the losses incurred by U.S. citizens. Compound interest at six
percent per annum brings the total value of the claims certified against
Cuba to $13,051,845,500. The U.S. government values the claims at
only $5.6 billion,22 5 which includes only simple interest.226 This figure
is inadequately low and inconsistent with international and U.S.
authority.
B. Full Compensation as an Inflexible Standard
In extreme cases, full compensation may not be necessary.2 27 The
Restatement (Third) also notes that full compensation is required "in
the absence of exceptional circumstances." 228 Comment d of the Re-
statement (Third) further discusses a very narrow range of "excep-
tional" circumstances, but exempts takings characteristic of those done
by Cuba.229 In INA Corp. v. Iran,230 Judge Lagergren endorsed, in prin-
220 Id. at 1042.
221 Id
222 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1987).
223 Id. at 188.
224 See, e.g., FA MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 380 (1990). Mann ar-
gues that "compound interest may be and, in the absence of special circumstances, should be
awarded to the claimant as damages by international tribunals." Id. (emphasis added).
225 In a U.S. State Department Cable it was estimated that Cuba owes investors more
than $5 billion for factories, land, and other confiscated property. Christopher Marquis,
Exile Warns Against Cuban Deals, TIMES-PIcAvuNE, Jan. 15, 1995, at A26; Christopher Marquis,
Sweeping Bill Targets Investment in Cuba, THE REcoRD, Fed. 10, 1995, at A17. See also Bruce
Stokes, The Cuban Conundrum, NAT'LJ., Sept. 17, 1994, at 2142, 2144-45.
226 Stokes, supra note 225.
227 See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 352 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). In his
treatise, Professor Oppenheim states that when private property interferes on a large scale
with a state's political or economic structure, it is "probable" that partial compensation is
permissible. Id. Unfortunately, Professor Oppenheim does not provide more specific gui-
dance concerning situations in which the partial compensation standard is more appropri-
ate. See id.
228 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 712.
229 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 712 cmt. d. Comment d states, "National
programs of agricultural land reform" may be "exceptional" circumstances justifying less than
appropriate compensation. Id. Specifically excluded from "exceptional" circumstances are
(1) a business "authorized or encouraged by the state;" (2) an enterprise taken for operation
as a growing concern by the state; (3) expropriations discriminating against aliens; and (4)
"wrongful" takings. Id. The Cuban confiscations fall within this exception, particularly (1)
and (3).
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ciple, a lower standard of compensation in "large-scale nationaliza-
tions," in which a country simply cannot afford to pay full
compensation. 231 In recent decisions, however, no arbitrator has ar-
gued that the amount of an award should be reduced due to economic
effects on the expropriating state.232
In the same arbitral decision, Judge Holtzmann soundly refuted
Judge Lagergren's statement that in cases of "large scale" nationaliza-
tions full compensation need not be paid.2 33 The International Court
ofJustice has described such partial compensation settlements as being
sui generis and as such, they are no guide under international law.23 4
Moreover, a country that claims it may pay partial compensation
to those it has financially injured also violates the international legal
principle of nemo judex in re sua.23 5 Professor Wortley states:
[A] State may exercise the liberty to accept less than is due to it or its
nationals, should it so decide. In order to further peaceful relations,
States have often done that. But the exercise of liberty by the creditor
State is a different matter from saying that the debtor has a right tofix the
terms of which he will be free from liability, especially when the seizure
takes place in circumstances which themselves constitute an
illegality.
23 6
C. U.S. Government Responsibility to the Property Owners
The U.S. Executive Branch may, within limits that are not fully
clear, settle the claims of its citizens against a foreign country.23 7 If the
230 INA Corp. v. Iran, supra note 174.
231 Id. at 390.
232 Norton, supra note 115, at 491.
233 See INA Corp. v. Iran, supra note 174, at 393.
234 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3, 40.
Other international tribunals have made consistent statements. For example, in TOPCO/
CALSASATIC, the arbitral tribunal stated that "the amicable settlements which have taken
place [have been inspired basically by considerations of expediency and not of legality." See
TOPCO/CALASIATIC supra note 165, at 488. In Sedco, the arbitral tribunal decision stated
that partial compensation lump-sum settlements between states and foreign companies:
can be so greatly inspired by non-judicial considerations - e.g., resumption of
diplomatic or trading relations - that it is extremely difficult to draw from them
conclusions as to opinio juris, i.e., the determination that the content of such
settlements was thought by the States involved to be required by international
law... [and] ... the International Court ofJustice and international arbitral
tribunals have cast serious doubts on the value of such settlements of custom.
Sedco, supra note 174, at 633. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
658 F.2d 875,892 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Partial compensation inheres in the process of negotiation
and compromise; we should no more look to the outcome of such a process to determine the
rights and duties of the parties in expropriation matters than we would look to the results of
settlements in ordinary tort or contract cases to determine the rules of damages to be
applied.").
235 "[N]o one can be judge in his own suit" see Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2,
of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier Between Iraq and Turkey), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12,
at 32 (Advisory Opinion of Nov. 21).
236 WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1977).
237 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (stating with respect to an agree-
ment entered into with Iran, "We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to
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President were to enter into a partial compensation agreement, the
U.S. government may then become liable to its citizens because of the
Fifth Amendment protection of property interests. The Fifth Amend-
ment provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
without just compensation. '238
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles,239 the Supreme Court referred to the "self-executing" char-
acter of the Fifth Amendment provision requiring compensation when
a governmental taking of property has occurred. 240 In its discussion of
the obligations imposed upon government by the Fifth Amendment,
the Court held that this provision does not "prohibit the taking of
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power."2 41 The Court reasoned:
This basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that
it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking. Thus, government action that works a
taking of property rights necessarily implicated the "constitutional ob-
ligation" to pay just compensation. 242
If the United States were to settle the claims of its citizens against
Cuba, those claimants would be left with no existing property interests
with respect to that nation. Any uncompensated portions of their
claims would be canceled against Cuba and thus rendered valueless.
Armstrong v. United States243 provides a similar fact pattern, in which the
federal government terminated a shipbuilding contract, thereby ac-
quiring all the materials purchased by the shipbuilder to perform the
contract.2 44 The suppliers to the shipbuilder were, upon the govern-
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities ... But where, as here, the settle-
ment of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can con-
clude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say that the
President lacks the power to settle such claims").
238 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the
Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AJ.I.L. 68, 84 (1985) (asserting that "it is by
no means settled that the Government's relinquishment of private claims to further national
interests, without providing compensation, does not violate the due process and 'taking with-
out just compensation' clauses of the Fifth Amendment").
239 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
240 Id. at 315.
241 Id. There is no question that U.S. citizens who possess claims certified against the
government of Cuba have constitutionally protected property interests in those claims.
Shanghai Power Company v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983) (plaintiff's claim certi-
fied by the FCSC against the People's Republic of China for losses resulting from the confis-
cation of its assets in Shanghai held to constitute a property interest). See also In Re Aircrash
in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (arguing that "there is no question
that claims for compensation are property interests that cannot be taken for public use with-
out compensation") (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and Gray v. United
States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886)).
242 482 U.S. at 315 (citing Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (emphasis added).
243 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
244 Id. at 41.
[VOL. 21
JUSTIFYING THE U.S EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
ment's action, left with unenforceable liens against those materials be-
cause of the federal government's sovereign immunity.245 The
Supreme Court held that the government's action constituted a "tak-
ing" of the liens because the value of the liens was destroyed.2 46
The Armstrong rule can be applied in an international context to a
partial compensation agreement between Cuba and the United States.
The court in Dames & Moore v. Regan upheld the President's action in
dismissing pending litigation by U.S. companies against Iran for,
among other things, property expropriations in that country, stating
"[t]hough we conclude that the President has settled petitioner's
claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the settlement has termi-
nated petitioner's possible taking claim against the United States."247
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated "[t] he
Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's
foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held
by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts.
2 4 8
In Shanghai Power Co. v. United States,249 the Claims Court found
that the U.S. government's settlement of a U.S. citizen's claim against
the People's Republic of China for partial value did not give rise to a
Fifth Amendment obligation to compensate the claimant for its un-
compensated losses.2 50 However, within a year of the decision in
Shanghai Power, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in.
Langenegger v. United States251 held that
The Claims Court [in Langenegger] below incorrectly held that appel-
lants' claim was nonjustifiable and that the extinguishment of a claim
under international law cannot amount to a taking; the court relied
on Shanghai Power Co. v. United States... We note that the lower court's
Shanghai Power decision does not present an absolute rule that the ex-
tinguishment of a claim under international law can never amount to
a taking.25 2
The Langenegger case reinforced well-settled law that requires each
takings issue be resolved on a case-by-case basis.253 Several factual dif-
245 Id. at 41-42.
246 Id. The Armstrong court also stated that one of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 49.
247 Dames & Moore v. Regan, supra note 237, at 688-89 n.14.
248 Id. at 691.
249 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), aff'd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
909 (1985).
250 This ruling is described as having unnecessarily "sweeping terms." See, e.g., Claggett,
supra note 217, at 27.
251 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
252 Id. at 1573.
253 The Supreme Court established this standard in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (asserting that the determination of whether a tak-
ing has occurred must be made on the facts of each case) (citing United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 168 (1958)). The Penn Central Court identified three signifi-
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ferences existed between the settlement with the People's Republic of
China and a potential settlement with Cuba in the post-Cold War
era.25 4 A major distinction is Cuba's willingness to allow foreign pri-
vate investors to participate in its economy.2 5 5 Such a willingness read-
ily distinguishes China at the time of the Shanghai Power decision from
Cuba, since property rights and private investment go hand in hand.2 56
The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the constitutional com-
mitment to property rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Dolan v.
City of Tigar&57 that "[w] e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status
of a poor relation."258 The Environmental Protection Agency must
comply with similar restraints mandating that the EPA provide full
compensation for its takings and for its declaring private property
unusable for various environmental purposes.2 59
If the United States were to settle its citizens' claims against Cuba
for less than their full value, the U.S. government could be held liable
for the difference. In the current environment of budget cutting and
deficit reduction, it is unlikely that the U.S. government would subject
itself to such liability. Thus, the United States would be unwise to en-
courage such a settlement because the potentially enormous liability of
the U.S. government would invariably cast a cloud over any progress in
U.S.-Cuban relations.
D. Investor Confidence Considerations
Foreign investors are essential to the economic growth of develop-
ing states.2 60 Investors are more likely to invest in a country when they
are confident that they will capture the expected future returns from
their investment.2 61 Consistent with this theme of investor confidence
cant factors: (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3)
"the character of the governmental action." Id. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (stating that there is no set formula to decide if
a taking has occurred; therefore, the determination is based on particular circumstances).
254 See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investment in China: Chimera of Protection and
Prediclability?, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 615, 617-21 (1994).
255 Id.
256 See id.
257 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).
258 Id. at 2320.
259 Environment and Conservation: Wetlands, 62 U.S.L.W. 2614, 2615 (Apr. 12, 1994).
260 See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Sovereignty, International Law and the United Na-
tions Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in 2 FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PaErrr
AND A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 310 (Detlev C. Dicke ed., 1987) (discussing
international standards for protection of property rights). See also Stokes, supra note 225.
261 Petersmann, supra note 260, at 335. The author, citing Adam Smith's WEALTH OF
NATIONS, states that economists base the economic advancement of the developed world on
two premises: (1) the individual incentives for the production of goods and services, for saving,
human efforts, ingenuity, spontaneous coordination and adjustment to continuous change
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is the protection of property rights.2 62 The protection of property
rights entails both a guarantee to pay full compensation for any prop-
erty that may be expropriated in the future and the guarantee of rights
to compensation for previously expropriated property.
The developing countries' need for foreign investment seriously
impairs the validity of any partial compensation standard for poten-
tially expropriated property.263 A partial compensation standard
would only deter the necessary foreign investment 264 because investors
are more likely to invest in a state if the state can take the investors'
assets only with the payment of compensation.2 65
The denial of rights to compensation for previously expropriated
property also weakens a state's ability to attract foreign investment.2 66
Denial of compensation would expose investors to additional uncer-
tainty by providing a dangerous precedent that their property rights
may not be respected.
V. Validity of the Embargo
This section will examine the U.S. embargo as a valid measure
against Cuba under international law to derive compensation for con-
fiscated properties. This section discusses Cuba's violation of interna-
tional law and the general legality of embargoes under international
law. This section also includes an explanation of alternative viewpoints
with respect to the Cuban embargo, concluding with an analysis of
their inability to provide an appropriate solution to the current U.S.-
Cuban stalemate.
A. Cuba's Violation of International Law
Cuba has violated international law by taking U.S. property in a
discriminatory manner and without justly compensating the owners.267
Cuba's sale of confiscated properties and goods produced on such
properties constitutes a further violation of international law.2 68
depend to a large extent on the laws and institutions for the protection of individual freedoms
and prperty rights assigning to each individual his or her personal spheres of autonomy, re-
sponsibility, potential gains and alternative losses; and (2) because the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market, rules allowing international market competition and the
international transfer of property rights enable each country to maximize its national economic
welfare by extending its national consumption possibilities beyond its national production
possibilities. Id. at 334-35.
262 Id
263 Norton, supra note 115, at 496.
264 Id. See also Petersmann, supra note 260, at 336 n.39 and accompanying text.
265 Norton, supra note 115, at 497.
266 Petersmann, supra note 260, at 335. See also Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Repa-
rations, and Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. Rv. 453, 453 (1994)
(discussing, in part, the favorable climate of restitution in Eastern Europe).
267 See infra notes 269-303 and accompanying text.
268 See infra notes 304-307 and accompanying text.
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1. Legal and Illegal Takings of Property
Section 712 of the Restatement (Third) provides a cogent sum-
mary of the international law of takings:
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state
that
(a) is not for a public purpose, or
(b) is discriminatory, or
(c) is not accompanied by a provision for just compensation;
For compensation to be just under this Subsection, it must, in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the
value of the property taken and be paid at the time of taking, or within
a reasonable time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and
in a form economically usable by the foreign national. 269
The Restatement (Third) articulates the standard that has been
set forth by established principles of international law. The principles
in Section 712 "have been challenged in recent years, but this Restate-
ment reaffirms that they continue to be valid and effective principles of
international law."270
Although the public purpose prong is of little utility,2 71 Cuba has
violated both the discrimination prong and the lack of just compensa-
tion prong.2 72 Cuba's confiscation of U.S. property, since the enact-
ment of the Nationalization Law in 1960, has been blatantly
269 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 712.
270 Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).
271 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 712 cmt. e. The public purpose prong
has not figured prominently in international claims, perhaps because the concept of public
purpose is broad and not subject to reexamination by other states. Id. See also WALTER
FLETCHER SMrrH, 2 R. Irr'L ARB. AwARDs 913 (1929); Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AJ.I.L. 437, 438
(1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). There is nonetheless
evidence that Castro did not take the property for a public purpose, as Castro may have been
motivated to enhance his own personal gain. For example, the U.S. Embassy in Havana
reported that Castro "was willing to sacrifice Cuban interests to his greater ambition of humili-
ating the United States, wrecking the inter-American system, and taking over leadership in
Latin America." Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security
Council (July 15, 1960), in Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Cuba, supra note 17, at 1014-15
(emphasis added). The U.S. Ambassador to Cuba noted that Castro "does not care what
happens to Cuba and that, in effect, he looks upon Cuba as sacrificial lamb which he can use
to defeat and humiliate [the United States] in its efforts to isolate him." See Telegram 2,
supra note 77, 995 (emphasis added). Although this analysis is not intended to be con-
clusory, it nonetheless provides evidence that the public policy prong has not been met. See
id.
272 Article 1 provides:
The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are authorized to orderjointly by means of resolutions, whenever they may deem it convenient in de-
fense of the national interest, the nationalization through expropriation, of the
properties or concerns belonging to natural or juridical persons nationals of
the United States of America or the concerns in which said persons have a major-
ity interest or participation even though they be organized under the laws of
Cuba.
Nationalization Law, supra note 60, art. 1 (emphasis added).
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discriminatory. 273 Article 1 of the Nationalization Law explicitly iso-
lated the U.S. property owners as the targets of expropriations. 274
Cuba clearly intended to retaliate against U.S. nationals for acts of
their government.275 Cuba's subsequent practice in dealing with ex-
propriated property indicates that Cuba's treatment of the United
States continues to be discriminatory. For example, Cuba has pro-
vided compensation for other foreign owners whose property was ex-
propriated under the Agrarian Reform Law.2 76
Furthermore, although Cuba provided provisions for compensa-
tion, the illusory nature of the provisions rendered them unjust. The
compensation provisions under the Agrarian Reform Law and the Na-
tionalization Law could not have compensated the U.S. owners. 277
Predictably, Cuba has not provided any compensation to U.S. own-
ers.278 As a result of the discriminatory intent and unjust provisions
for compensation, Cuba's taking of U.S.-owned property is in violation
of international law.
2. Opinio Juris
Opiniojuris is an alternative way of establishing Cuba's violation of
international law. Opiniojuris stands for the principle that.(1) a state
273 See id.
274 Id.
275 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 956 (1968). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust, 822 F.2d 230,
237 (2d Cir. 1987). The Preamble to the Nationalization Law provides perhaps the most
compelling evidence of retaliatory intent:
The attitude assumed by the Government and legislative power of the United
States of America of constant aggression for political purposes against the funda-
mental interests of the Cuban economy, emphatically evidenced by the amend-
ment recently passed by the Congress of said country to the Sugar Act at the
request of the executive power, by which the President of that nation is granted
exceptional powers to reduce the participation of Cuban sugar in the sugar
market of that county, as an arm of political action against Cuba, obliges the
Revolutionary Government to adopt without hesitation, also the measures that
it may deem pertinent for the defense of the national sovereignty and the free
economic development of our country.
Nationalization Law, supra note 60, Pmbl.
276 See Agrarian Reform Law, supra note 23. For a discussion of the compensation of
Spanish interests, see generally Castro Will Compensate Expropriated Spaniards, LATIN AMERICAN
WEEKLY REPORT, Dec. 4, 1986, at 3; DOMINGUEZ, supra note 92, at 198; Michael W. Gordon,
Settlement of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property between Cuba and Nations other than the
U.S., 5 L. AMER. 457 (1973) [hereinafter Gordon, Settlement of Claims]. For a discussion of the
compensation of French and Swiss interests see generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 92, at 190-
91. For a discussion of the compensation of Canadian interests see generally DOMINGUEZ,
supra note 92, at 190, 198. For a discussion of the compensation of British interests, see
generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 92, at 200. The actual text of the 1967 Switzerland-Cuba
compensation agreement and the 1967 France-Cuba compensation agreement can be found
in RICHARD LILLICH AND BURNS WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT By LUMP
SUM AGREEMENT 339, 343 (1974).
277 For an analysis of the illusory nature of the Agrarian Reform Law see supra notes 27-
38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the illusory nature of the Nationalization Law
see supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
278 See Testimony, supra note 92.
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regards a particular practice as a norm of customary international law;
and (2) a state believes that the practice is obligatory under interna-
tional law.2 79 A state is thus bound to an international rule once it
shows that it intends to adhere to the international rule.
The International Court ofJustice (hereinafter "I.C.J."), in Nicara-
gua v. United States,280 expounded upon the principle of opinio juris.
Nicaragua had instituted proceedings in the I.CJ. against the United
States for carrying out military activities in Nicaragua 281 in violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.282 The United States challenged
I.C.J. jurisdiction, arguing that the I.C.J. does not have jurisdiction to
hear cases concerning the application of the U.N. Charter. 283 The
I.C.J. held that the United States was nonetheless bound to Article 2(4)
prohibition on the use of force.284 The I.C.J. reasoned that since the
United States and Nicaragua agreed to incorporate the Article into the
U.N. Charter, this agreement made that rule "binding upon them."285
Thus, the United States and Nicaragua satisfied the first prong of
opiniojuris by regarding Article 2(4) as a principle of international law.
The I.CJ. then determined that both countries believed Article
2(4) was obligatory under international law, thus satisfying the second
opiniojuris prong. The I.CJ. examined U.S. and Nicaraguan practice
and concluded that "both Parties take the view that the principles as to
the use of force incorporated in the United Nations Charter corre-
spond, in essentials, to those found in customary international law...
[and] . . .therefore accept a treaty-law obligation to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force ... "286 The
I.C.J. concluded that the United States and Nicaragua expressed an
opinio juris respecting Article 2 (4) and were therefore bound.287
The opiniojuris principle is also applicable to the conflict between
the United States and Cuba. Both the United States and Cuba (1)
regard compensation for expropriated property as a norm of customary
international law; and (2) believe that the practice is obligatory under
international law. There is considerable similarity in practice between
the two countries to support this proposition.
The United State's emphasis on the inviolable quality of private
279 North Sea Continental Cases (F.RG. v. Den.)(F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 § 77
(discussing the standards and application of the doctrine of opiniojuris).
280 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. United States].
281 Id. § 15.
282 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
283 ld, § 10.
284 Id. § 188.
285 Id. § 184.
286 Id. § 188.
287 Id.
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property rights is well established. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 28 8 The history of compensa-
tion for property takings is also firmly rooted in Anglo-American
law.
2 8 9
Cuba has also developed the principle of compensation for expro-
priated property.2 90 The 1901 Cuban Constitution provides that for-
eigners residing in Cuba shall enjoy the same legal protection as
Cuban citizens, 29 1 that the government shall not deprive an individual
of his or her property without proper cause and indemnification, 292
and that government shall not impose the penalty of confiscation of
property under any circumstances. 293 The 1940 Cuban Constitution
confirmed that an individual's property right is a fundamental right
requiring state protection.2 94 In 1948, Cuba reaffirmed this view by
signing the Economic Agreement of Bogota.295 Article 25 of the
agreement provides that a state will not take discriminatory actions
against a foreign national's property; if such taking must occur, com-
288 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
289 The 'just compensation" clause is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. See FRED
BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 56 (1973). This right first appeared in the Magna Carta
of 1215. Id. KingJohn sealed in Chapter 39: "No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in
prison, or deprived of his freehold, or in any way molested; and we will not set forth against him,
not send against him, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land." Id.
(emphasis added). The British citizens who settled in North America adopted this principle.
Id. at 80. Thus, property rights left an enduring imprint on the development of colonial
legislatures. DAvID HAWKE, THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 62 (1966). James Madison ultimately
embraced these broad rights in the Fifth Amendment, making explicit the bar on uncom-
pensated takings. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710 (1984). History reveals that
the right became an established principle of Anglo-American legal tradition. Id. at 715. The
United States has reinforced this right with the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, Pub. L.
89-171, 79 Stat. 653 (1964), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2), which prevents application of the act of
state doctrine to cases involving claims to property, thereby permitting a U.S. court to pro-
ceed with an adjudication against a foreign state on a takings issue unless the President of the
United States officially states that such an adjudication in the particular case would embarrass
the conduct of foreign policy. S. Rep. No. 1188, pt. I, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964). This
Amendment clearly shows that the U.S. government is committed to protecting the property
rights of U.S. citizens.
290 GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS, supra note 22, at 26.
291 CUBA CONST. (Constitution of Cuba, 1901), art. 10(1); reprinted in Rodriguez, 2 INT'L
BUREAU OF THE AM. REPUBS., AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONS 112 (Jos6 Ignacio Rodriguez trans.
1907).
292 Id. art. 32.
293 Id. art. 33.
294 CUBA CONST. (Constitution of Cuba, 1940), arts. 24, 87, translated inAmosJ. Peaslee,
1 Constitutions of Nations 610 (2d ed. 1956). For further information on the 1940 Constitu-
tion, see Jonathan Wachs, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution: Arguments for Social and Eco-
nomic Rghts in a Post-Castro Government, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L & POL'y 525 (1994); Ignacio E.
Sanchez, Cuban Property Rights and the 1940 Constitution, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 135
(1994).
295 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3263, NINTH INT'L ORG. & CONF. SERIES II, AMERICAN
REPUBLICS 3 201 (1948).
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pensation is due in a "prompt, adequate and effective manner. "296
The Declaration of the Delegation of Cuba affirmed Article 25, stating
that the "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation provision is
consistent with the Cuban Constitution.29 7
Furthermore, Article 25 of the Cuban Constitution of 1992 reiter-
ates this principle: "Expropriation of assets is authorized for reasons of
public purpose or social benefit, and with due compensation."298 This
Article is significant because private property now exists in Cuba and
this property enjoys constitutional protection. For example, Article 15
provides that state property may be conveyed "to natural persons or
bodies corporate [in] special cases wherein the partial or total transfer
of any economic object is intended for purposes of the country's devel-
opment."299 Article 23 states that Cuba "recognizes the property
owned by mixed enterprises, and by economic partnerships and as-
sociations established according to law." 300
Cuba's domestic law indicates that Cuba has recognized the inter-
national law of compensation for expropriation. The provision requir-
ing compensation has been a consistent part of the Cuban
Constitution.301 Cuba has also been a signatory to international agree-
ments upholding full compensation.3 0 2 In addition, Cuba has entered
into agreements to compensate foreigners from whom it expropriated
property.303
The above discussion indicates that both the United States and
Cuba regard and believe that compensation for expropriated property
is a norm of customary international law. Opiniojuris dictates that they
ire bound. Cuba must therefore be held responsible for its violations
of customary international law by not compensating former U.S. own-
ers of Cuban property.
3. Selling Stolen Goods
Cuba is further violating international law by selling confiscated
property or interests in those properties to new foreign investors. A
government that acquires confiscated property does not acquire good
title.304 A buyer of stolen property with knowledge of a defective title
296 Id. at 209.
297 Id. at 216.
298 CUBA CONST. (Constitution of the Republic, 1992) art. 25.
299 Id. art. 15.
300 Id. art. 23.
301 The Cuban Constitutions all maintained the compensation provision before and
throughout the Castro regime. See supra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
302 Upon taking control, Castro said that "all international agreements will be upheld in
force." Memorandum, supra note 19, at 347.
303 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
304 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246 (Aden Sup.
Ct.), reprinted in 20 I.L.R. 316 (discussing the position that title to a cargo of oil does not pass
to government upon illegal confiscation) [hereinafter The Rose Mary].
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does not become a bona fide purchaser and therefore acquires no bet-
ter title than the confiscating government.3 05 Title to any natural re-
source grown or extracted from the confiscated property does not pass
to the government upon illegal nationalization.3 06 Furthermore, any
investor who acquires confiscated property may be liable for trespass,
unjust enrichment, rent, waste, or damage to property.30 7
B. Justification for the Embargo under International Law
The frequent use of embargoes and other economic sanctions by
many countries constitutes persuasive evidence that no clear norm ex-
ists against them in customary international law.3 08 In Nicaragua v.
United States,30 9 Nicaragua asserted that the United States had violated
the principle of nonintervention by cutting economic aid, by reducing
Nicaragua's sugar quota by 90 percent, and by imposing a comprehen-
sive trade embargo.310 While the Court ruled that the United States
had violated customary international law by training and arming the
anti-government contras, the majority nevertheless concluded on the
economic sanctions: "[T] he Court has merely to say that it is unable to
regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as
a break of the customary-law principle of non-intervention." 311
305 Brice M. Claggett, Public International Legal Standards Applicable to Property Ex-
propriation in Cuba 12-13, Address Before the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 1994) (discuss-
ing, in part, the rights of U.S. property owners in Cuba).
306 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 175; N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum
Maatschappij v. The War Damage Commission, Court of Appeal, Singapore (April 13, 1956),
reprinted in 23 I.L.R. 810, 812 (1956); The Rose Mary, supra note 304, at 36, 217, 328. See
generally Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National Law, 48
BRIT. Y.B. INrr'L L. 128-39, 46-57 (1976-77); George E. Glos, The Effect of Foreign Decrees of
Expropriation in the Courts of the Forum, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 241, 241-58 (1978); Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Chilean Copper Nationalization Cases before German Courts, 69 A.J.I.L. 110 (1975);
Evrett W. Benton, The Libyan Expropriations: Further Developments on the Remedy of lnvalidation of
Title, 11 Houston L. Rev. 924 (1974); R.Y. Jennings, Nullity and Effectiveness in International
law, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD McNAIR 64, 65-
81 (1965); O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 267 (1955).
For the position of the U.S. Department of State with respect to nationalized Libyan oil,
see Statement by the Department of State on Policy on "Hot" Libyan Oil, 13 I.L.M. 767, 770(1974); and more recently, for its position on foreign expropriation decrees. See generally
Letter from Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Dec. 8, 1977, reprinted in part in 72 A.J.I.L. 375, 398 (1978).
307 Brice B. Claggett, Public International Legal Standards Applicable to Property Ex-
propriation in Cuba 13, Address Before the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 1994).
308 Ibrahim F.I. Shiata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International Law,
68 A.J.I.L. 591, 625-26 (1974).
309 See Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 280.
310 Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L.1L 1159, 1167 n.12 (1987) (stating that there is no clear rule against impos-
ing economic sanctions).
311 Nicaragua v. United States, supra note 280, at 116 (emphasis added).
Restatement (Third) § 905 provides an alternative legal framework for which a state can
respond unilaterally respond to another state's violation of international law-
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), a state victim of a violation of an international
obligation by another state may resort to countermeasures that might otherwise
be unlawful, if such measures (a) are necessary to terminate the violation or
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In an attempt to negotiate compensation for expropriated prop-
erty, the United States has resorted to economic sanctions nine times
since World War 11.312 The United States has been successful in eight




There are three common views concerning the U.S. approach to
Cuban foreign policy. The first view is the "liberal" view, which advo-
cates that the embargo is a relic of the Cold War and the United States
should remove the embargo for humanitarian reasons. The "free
trade" view argues that the United States should lift the embargo and
flood Cuba with U.S. investment and influence, thus precipitating
political change. In contrast, the conservative "isolationist" view asserts
that there should be no liberalization of relations until Cuba makes
changes consistent with the principles of democracy and free enter-
prise. Each of these approaches toward Cuba is misguided because
they all distort the central rationale of the embargo: to derive compen-
sation for confiscated property.
There is an increasing chorus of advocates for the "liberal" view.
Former President Jimmy Carter stated that "[i]t's time for us [the
United States] to begin discussions on how we can alleviate this crisis
which has caused tremendous suffering among the people of Cuba
and has distorted this hemisphere's concept of freedom and democ-
prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation; and (b) are not out of
proportion to the violation and the injury suffered. (2) The threat or use of
force in response to a violation of international law is subject to prohibitions on
the threat or use of force in the United Nations Charter, as well as to Subsec-
tion (1).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 905 (emphasis added). The U.S. embargo satisfies
the (1) (a) "necessity" prong. See id. cmt. c. For purposes of this section, an embargo is an
"economic sanction" and not a "use of force." Therefore, the U.S. embargo does not violate
the U.N. Charter's prohibition of the use of force in self-help. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4.
The Charter forbids the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." Id. This provision does not address the use of economic sanc-
tions. See id.
312 GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 7
(1985).
313 The most recent success involved Ethiopia. In December 1985, Ethiopia agreed to
pay the United States $7,000,000 to settle the claims of U.S. nationals. Ethiopia-United States
Compensation Agreement, Dec. 19, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 56, 58 (1986). See also Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F. Supp. 660
(W.D. Mich. 1985) (stating that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear claims against the Ethio-
pian government). Other successful cases include Iran in 1979-81 and 1951-53, Chile in
1970-73, Peru in 1968-74, Brazil in 1962-64, Ceylon in 1961-65, Egypt in 1956, and Mexico in
1938-47. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 312, at 236-39, 626-35 (Iran), 439-44 (Chile), 434-
38 (Peru), 340-45 (Brazil), 324-28 (Ceylon), 269-74 (Egypt), 150-54 (Mexico).
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racy."3 14 Professor Andrew Zimbalist suggests the United States lift the
embargo all at once, stating that the United States may retain leverage
over Cuba by, inter alia, waiving compensation for confiscated prop-
erty.31 5 Professor Rudi Dornbusch suggests that in a post-Castro Cuba,
"[w] hether and when financial compensation should be offered can be
discussed in time," since Cuba's resources should be kept free for re-
construction.31 6 U.S. Representative Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) has pro-
posed that the United States unilaterally lift the embargo against Cuba,
urging the President to take steps to settle the property claims of U.S.
citizens after lifting the embargo. 317 Several other commentators have
similarly condemned the embargo.318
These arguments confuse the true rationale of the embargo and
advocate a course of action that is detrimental to Cuba. The property
dimension of the embargo has been fully established,3 19 and successful
resolution of the property issue is necessary to for a climate of investor
confidence in the Cuban economy. 320
Former President Richard Nixon 321 and the Wall Street Journal
have advocated the "free trade" view. The Wall Street Journal, compar-
ing the situation in Cuba to China's recent pattern of development,
argues that lifting the embargo would benefit "precisely those forces
that are most likely to liberalize Cuba's economic and political power
structure. 32
2
Lifting the embargo, without resolving the property issue, will not
bring about the desired change. It is clear that foreign direct invest-
ment is widely accepted as essential to developing economies. Without
respect for property rights, the flow of foreign investment is likely to be
insignificant and limited to short-term get-rich-quick schemes. Fur-
thermore, if Cuba is to develop like China, Cuba must do precisely
what China did: resolve the property issue.3 23
314 Former President Carter Calls for Talks with Cuba, RauERs, Sept. 21, 1994, available on
LEXIS, News library, REUNA file.
315 Andrew Zimbalist, Give Castro a Carrot, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1994, at A23. Professor
Zimbalist argues that the only reason that the embargo is still in place is because of the
political influence of the Cuban-American National Foundation [hereinafter "CANF"], a
powerful and conservative Cuban-American organization. On the issue of how to achieve a
peaceful transition in Cuba, Professor Zimbalist has stated that "engagement rather than
isolation has proven to be a better policy." Id. Although CANF has been influential in recent
policy making, the underlying foundation of private property has existed since the inception
of the embargo. Stokes, supra note 225, at 2144.
316 Rudi Dornbusch, Getting Ready for Cuba after Castro, Bus. WK., May 24, 1993, at 19. See
infra part VIA
317 H.R. REP. No. 2229, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
318 See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., All that Castro is Left with is His Pride, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 2, 1994, at A36; Jesse Jackson, China Gets Red Carpet and Cuba Gets the Rack, NEws TiBs-
UNE, Apr. 3, 1994, at F3.
319 See supra part II.
320 See supra part IV.D.
321 Ric-ARD M. NIXON, BEYOND PEACE 138 (1994).
322 Lift the Embargo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at AIO.
323 See Shanghai Power v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 249 (1983). China resolved out-
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The conservative "isolationist" view is equally problematic. Advo-
cates encourage a "hard-line" approach and then expect to transform
Cuba into a capitalist model after Castro falls out of power.3 24 The
priority of compensation for confiscated property is unclear. This view
is laden with outdated Cold War political rhetoric and is counter-
productive. Isolationists are a very strong political force in the United
States, and have recently showed their strength by lobbying successfully
for the Cuban Democracy Act.3
25
2. The Cuban Democracy Act
In October of 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Cuban Democ-
racy Act 326 (hereinafter "CDA"). Under the CDA's authority, subsidi-
aries of U.S. companies based abroad that have traded with Cuba in
the past could be prosecuted under U.S. law for doing so in the fu-
ture.32 7 Moreover, the U.S. government would prohibit ships from en-
tering the United States from Cuban ports for a period of 180 days3 28
and would prohibit ships from entering the United States that carry
goods or passengers to or from Cuba in which any Cuban national has
an interest.3 2 9
The United States can waive these economic sanctions if Cuba
meets certain requirements. 3 30 However, none of the requirements in-
standing property claims in 1979 with a lump sum payment. Id. In 1979, President Carter
established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Id. As part of the nor-
malization process, the two nations settled the outstanding claims of U.S. nationals against
the PRC. The claims were settled for $80,500,000 to be paid to the United States over a
period of six years. Id. The thaw in U.S.-Vietnamese relations was also facilitated subsequent
to Vietnam's resolution of the compensation issue. Steven Greenhouse, US. and Vietnam
Plan to Exchange Low-Level Envoys, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, at Al. Vietnam agreed to pay
$208.5 million for private and U.S. government claims on nationalized properties. Id. This
amount represents 100% of the total sought by U.S. negotiators. Id.
324 Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
stated that Clinton's policy is "to isolate the Cuban government, diplomatically, politically and
environmentally." Dick Kirschten, A Bridge to Cuba, NAT'LJ., Sept. 11, 1993, at 2219 (empha-
sis added). Jorge Mas Canosa, President of the Cuban American National Foundation,
stated, "You must kick out the last leg of the stool ... do not have pity!" Ann Louise Bardach,
Our Man in Miami, NEw REPUBLlC, Oct.3, 1994, at 20. See also A] Cardenas, Cuban Exiles Need
United Voice to Counter Expected Efforts to Lip Embargo, MiAMi HERALD, Aug. 15, 1993, at IC;
Mimi Whitefield, State Department Says Cuba Embargo Still the Best Policy, M~mMI HERALD, Mar.
13, 1994, at 21A; Christopher Marquis, Some Say U.S. Ignoring Cuba Embargo Violators, MiAMi
HERALD, Apr. 8, 1994, at 18A.
325 See, e.g., Pamela Constable, New Voices of Exile. BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 1993, at M10;
Peter H. Stone, Cuban Clout, The National Journal, February 20, 1993, at 449; Ricardo
Chavira, Capitalism's hard-liners, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, December 28, 1992, at IA. See
also GILLIAN GuNN, CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (1993).
326 22 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6010 (Supp. V. 1993).
327 Id. § 6005(a).
328 Id. § 6005(b)(1).
329 Id. § 6005(b)(2).
330 Section 6007 of the U.S. Code provides that the President may waive any sanctions if
the Government of Cuba: (1) hold democratic elections; (2) permits opposition parties to
organize, (3) shows respect for human rights; (4) continues to move toward establishing a free
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cludes compensation for the confiscated property.33 1 The legislative
history of the CDA is equally devoid of any reference to compensation
for the confiscations. 332 Because it is inconsistent with prior U.S. pol-
icy on the embargo, the CDA is a flawed measure. 333 The U.S. em-
bargo, as properly construed, is a legal measure to derive
compensation for the confiscated property. Therefore, the CDA is an
aberration from this traditional purpose.
3. Cuba's Challenge to the Cuban Democracy Act
The United Nations and several commentators have challenged
the legality of the CDA. 334 Cuba has successfully encouraged the
United Nations to pass Resolutions 47/19335 and 48/16,336 both of
which condemn the CDA. In challenging the embargo before the
United Nations, Cuba relied on Article 4 of Resolution 3281, which
provides in pertinent part:
Every State has the right to engage in international trade and other
forms of economic cooperation irrespective of any differences in polit-
market economic system; and (5) commits itself to constitutional change that would ensure free
and fair elections. Id. § 6007 (emphasis added).
331 Section 6007 of the U.S. Code provides that the executive branch may lift sanctions
against Cuba if the President determines that the government of Cuba "is moving toward
establishing a free market economic system." Id. § 6007(a)(4). Because property rights and
free market economics are mutually dependent, property rights are implicit. See supra part
IV.D.
332 However, the illegality of selling goods from confiscated property was brought to the
attention of the committee. Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992; Hearings on H.R.
4168 and H.R. 5323 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 244-47
(1992) (testimony of Mr. Roger D. Chesley, Vice President and General Counsel, Amstar
Corporation). One author asserts that the United States used the confiscations as justifica-
tion for the CDA. Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War
Strikeout, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 15, 40 (1994). Moreover, when the Cuban Democracy Act
came under fire in the United Nations General Assembly, U.N. Votes against U.S. on Embargo of
Cuba, Cm. TRiB., Nov. 25, 1992, at 1, U.S. Ambassador Watson to the U.N. defended the U.S.
position by stating that Cubans were using the CDA as a pretext to involve the United Nations
in the bilateral relations between the United States and Cuba. U.N. denounces new US. em-
bargo against Cuba, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al. Watson stated that the United
States "chooses not to trade with Cuba... [because] the government of Cuba, in violation of
international law, expropriated billions of dollars worth of private property belonging to U.S.
individuals and has refused to make reasonable restitution." Id.
333 See supra part II.B. Congress' express inclusion of property in the recently passed
Libertad Act remedies this deficiency in the CDA and further continues the basis of resolving
the property issue before liberalizing relations. See Libertad Act, supra note 110 and accom-
panying text.
334 See, e.g.,Jerry W. Cain,Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the United States' Trade Embargo
Against Cuba: The United Nations General Assembly's Call for an End to the U.S. Trade Embargo, 24
GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 379 (1994);Julia P. Herd, The Cuban Democracy Act: Another Extraterrito-
rialAct that Won't Work, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 397 (1994); Trevor R.Jeffries, The Cuban Democ-
racy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrot and a Broken Stick?, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993).
335 Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United
States of America against Cuba, GA. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 39, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/47/19 (1993).
336 Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United
States of America against Cuba, GA Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 30, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/48/16 (1993).
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ical, economic and social systems. No State shall be subjected to dis-
crimination of any kind based solely on such differences. 337
Cuba further argues that the CDA is an "extreme and unjustified inter-
ference with the U.S. sovereign decision to maintain normal trade and
shipping relations with Cuba."3 38
Economic sanctions are a completely legal measure under interna-
tional law to resolve an international difference.3 3 9 The United States
has not imposed the embargo solely because Cuba has a different polit-
ical, economic, and social system. Even if the CDA targets the political
differences, the traditional rationale for the embargo is based on the
violation of property rights under international law. Therefore, U.S.
economic sanctions are not based "solely" on the differences in the
political systems.
Cuba's principal arguments against the CDA include that the U.S.
embargo is extraterritorial3 40 and economically coercive. 341 While the
merit of each argument is questionable,3 42 an analysis of the legality of
337 See Resolution 3201, supra note 144, art. 4.
338 MICHAEL KRINSKY & DAVID GOLOVE, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MSURES AGAINST
CUBA 43 (1993). Mr. Krinsky and Mr. Golove are associated with the law firm that has repre-
sented the government of Cuba since 1960. Id. at 1.
339 See supra part V.B.
340 KRINSKY & GOLOVE, supra note 338. See also supra part IV.
341 See supra part V.
342 Section 402 of the Restatement (Third), states that the United States has jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to:
(1) "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory"; (2) the "activities, interests, status, or relations of its
nations outside as well as within its territory"; and (3) "certain conduct outside
its territory by persons not its nations that is directed against the security of the
state."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 116, § 402 (emphasis added).
Comment c states that the United States and other states have used this provision to
assert jurisdiction over: (1) "goods or technology located abroad on the basis of their origin
in the state exercising jurisdiction"; and (2) "companies outside their territory on the basis of
the state's control over affiliates present in the territory." Id. Comment c. Section 403 of the
Restatement (Third) provides some limitations on this ability to prescribe jurisdiction, stat-
ing that the exercise of jurisdiction must be "reasonable." Id. § 403(2). This Section in-
cludes "the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system" as a factor in determining whether jurisdiction is appropriate. Id. (emphasis added).
Because the embargo is a response to Cuba's violation of international law, and the U.S. en-
forcement of this embargo may ultimately benefit the international economic order by facili-
tating the international flow of capital and investment, the U.S. imposition of more harsh
sanctions to bring about this change could be considered "reasonable." See supra Part V.
Cuba has also used paragraph 2 of GA. Resolution 2131 in an attempt to condemn the
CDA. KRINSKY & GOLOVE, supra note 338, at 42. Paragraph 2 provides of the resolution
provides that: "No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the
exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure advantages of any kind." Declaration on the Inadmis-
sibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, GA. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., at 11 (1965). The traditional
embargo is not designed to "subordinate" Cuba's sovereignty, but to derive compensation for
confiscated property. Claims of economic "coercion" are subordinate to legitimate claims
under international law for the compensation of wrongfully confiscated property. See gener-
ally supra notes 246-77 and accompanying text.
Cuba's attempt to recruit the United Nations to force the United States to lift the em-
[VOL. 21
1995] JUSTIFYING THE U.S EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
the CDA is largely irrelevant. Rather, the inquiry is whether U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions are necessary and proportionate.343 U.S. economic sanc-
tions clearly meet this standard. 344
V1. Recommended Approach
A. Practical Realities
International law requires Cuba either to return the property or
to pay fair market value from time of taking plus interest compounded
annually to all the owners. However, the Cuban economy has been
devasted,345 thus challenging the implementation of a coherent com-
pensation plan. 346
B. Restitution
Restitution is the optimum remedy.3 47 Cuba's restitution pro-
gram should be "designed to right the wrongs of the past" thereby
helping the new government build credibility as a 'Justice-administer-
ing state. '348 The appropriate restitution plan would also assist in
Cuba's attempts to privatize its economy through the placement of
property in private hands.3 49
Other benefits of restitution include: (1) increasing levels of em-
ployment; (2) additional tax revenues; (3) an improvement in the bal-
ance of payment accounts; (4) a needed expansion of exports; (5) the
introduction of new technology; and (6) a more diverse economy
which is less dependent on sugar. 350 The remedy of restitution will
therefore provide the Cuban population with increasing levels of
bargo contravenes the resolution it seeks to use for protection. See Declaration on the Inadmissi-
bility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, GA. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess. (1965). Outside of the ques-
tionable extraterritorial aspects of the CDA, the U.S. embargo is ajustified domestic policy in
response to Cuba's violation of international law. Article 1 of Resolution 2131 states that
"[n]o State has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State." Id. art. 1 (emphasis added). Thus, any external
effects of the embargo must also be protected by the resolution.
In any case, resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding international law;
therefore, a discussion of U.S.-Cuban relations based upon the authority of these resolutions
is largely theoretical. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
343 RESrATEMErrN (TmuRD), supra note 116, § 905 (asserting the need for "necessary" and
"proportionate" responses in connection with violations of international law).
34 Because Section 905 of the Restatement (Third) allows the United States to take
countermeasures that "might otherwise be illegal" if they are in response to Cuba's violations
of international law, the legality argument is irrelevant. Cuba's violations are clearly estab-
lished. See supra part VA.
345 For a comprehensive analysis of Cuba's current economic crisis, see Truyol, supra
note 332, at 52-70.
346 Id.
347 Note that this Article focuses on U.S. corporate property. For a discussion of the
standard that is appropriate for residential property see infra note 355.
348 Newton, supra note 266, at 454.
349 Id.
350 Jos6 F. Alonso, An Economic Exercise in Restitution, Address Before the Future of
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welfare.3 51
C. Full Compensation
Where restitution is not possible, Cuba should employ a system of
full compensation for the property owners.352 However, the depleted
Cuban treasury renders this approach infeasible. Thus, to compensate
the owners of confiscated property that cannot be returned, an alter-
native approach to a full lump-sum payment system is necessary.
A bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Cuba
would provide a framework for a long-term payment of the confiscated
property. The BIT should acknowledge full compensation for past in-
vestments in confiscated property. Article XIII of the 1987 BIT Model
Negotiating Text expressly provides that the BITs "shall apply to invest-
ments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to investments
made or acquired thereafter."353 Several nations have adopted a provi-
sion stating that a BIT retroactively applies to previous investments.3 54
Any claimants to whom it is infeasible to return property would
thus have recourse to gain long-term payment for their property. The
BIT would create a separate tribunal, comparable to the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, to deal exclusively with property claims. The tribunal
would hear each case individually. In addition, owners may wish to
negotiate directly with the government for a more efficient settlement.
Some parties may opt for a partial-restitution, partial-compensation set-
tlement if certain segments of their property have been unalterably
changed, thus rendering complete restitution infeasible.3 55 This
the Sugar Industry in a Free Cuba Conference 10 (July 15, 1994) (transcript available from
the National Association of Sugar Mill Owners of Cuba, Inc., Miami, FL).
351 Id. Restitution has had many pitfalls in Eastern Europe. The example of Eastern
European countries' handling of the return of confiscated property is an excellent case of
the dangers involved in such programs. Insufficient attention to the uncertainty introduced
by complex restitution policies can bring serious difficulties to the best intentioned program.
Also, different types of assets, such as real property and regulated utilities, require signifi-
cantly differentiated treatment. Finally, related issues such as the valuation of foreign ex-
change, the role of foreign investments, and the desire for establishing a broad distribution
of property rights must be considered within the same equity/efficiency paradox. Luis R.
Luis, Lessons from Privatization in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Address Before the
Cuba in Transition Conference (Aug. 15-17, 1991) (Association for the Study of the Cuban
Economy, Florida International University, Miami, FL). See also Frances H. Foster, Post-Soviet
Approaches to Restitution: Lessons for Cuba, Paper presented to the ABA Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 1994) (discussing restitution in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
352 Note that this standard is the standard under international law, codified by Chorz6w
Factory, supra note 128, at 194.
353 See BIT Model Negotiating Text, supra note 196, at A-4.
354 Bangladesh, Turkey, and Poland have adopted retroactivity language. See VANDE-
VELDE, POLICY AND PRACrICE, supra note 191, at 63-64.
355 Restitution of residential property may be problematic because many Cuban families
now live in these residences. Thus, to compensate the residential property owners, a portion
of each month's rent should be used to compensate the owner over a period of years. The
standard for compensation for residential property would be the same as that for corporate
property: fair market value at time of taking plus interest.
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framework would provide the optimum resolution for each individual
claim.
A BIT would also guarantee the future protection of property
rights in Cuba. In addition to serving as a symbol that the Cuban gov-
ernment has embraced a pro-market economic policy, a BIT would ul-
timately attract greater private investment.3 56 Once enacted, a BIT
would provide genuine protection for U.S. investment.35 7 A BIT also
would serve to attract further investment in Cuba and gradually help
Cuba obtain most favored nation status, thus further opening Cuba to
U.S. investment.358 The treaty also would perform the educational
function of informing government officials with little experience in op-
erating a market economy of the kinds of policies considered necessary
or advisable by private investors.3 59
VII. Conclusion
Cuba is clearly in violation of international law by discriminatorily
confiscating U.S.-owned property and providing unjust provisions for
compensation. The United States is therefore justified in imposing the
embargo as a necessary and proportionate remedy. Cuba must for-
mally arrange to discharge itself from its international obligations
before the United States considers the reestablishment of diplomatic
and economic relations with Cuba. The U.S. government must ensure
that the inviolable nature of private property is respected by the Cuban
government before any progess is made in liberalizing U.S.-Cuban
relations.
356 Vandevelde, The Second Wave, supra note 189, at 634.
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
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